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COMMENTS
DIAMONDS ARE FOREVER? IMPLICATIONS OF UNITED STATES
ANTITRUST STATUTES ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE
DE BEERS DIAMOND CARTEL
Diamonds are forever-or at least they should be, given the over-inflated
prices Americans pay for them. Many Americans hold diamonds in high
esteem, cherishing them as symbols of love and affection. Perhaps this
explains why Americans are willing to pay far more for diamonds than they
should. On the other hand, perhaps the real reason is the diamond cartel and
the inability of the United States Government to apply the antitrust laws for
the protection of the American public as they were originally intended.
Americans typically end up purchasing a diamond that they mistakenly
believe has high extrinsic value, and for other reasons that cannot be
rationally explained. The American people sought to prevent these types of
situations from occurring almost a hundred years ago when they enacted the
first antitrust statute. ' Now, the average lay person may not even know the
legal definition of "antitrust," which very likely only elicits the notion that
the government "protects" consumers by restricting monopolies.2 No doubt
people would be surprised to discover that they are paying inflated prices
because the United States Government has been unable to enforce the spirit
of the antitrust laws against the large, powerful international diamond cartel.
Indeed, the business of importing and selling diamonds in the United States
is but one example of the failure of United States antitrust laws against
international cartels.
The United States will become more dependant on international trade for
its economic growth and survival as the global economy becomes more
pervasive.3 That trade must be fair, not only to foreign countries, but also
to the United States. By studying and understanding the lack of control
United States antitrust statutes have on the diamond industry, the United
States will be in a better position to solve not only the diamond problem, but
also the problem of other monopolistic industries.
1. See W.W. THORNTON, A TREATISE ON COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE § 7, at
10 (2d ed. 1928).
2. A monopoly is "[a] privilege or peculiar advantage vested in one or more persons or
companies, consisting in the exclusive right (or power) to carry on a particular business or trade,
manufacture a particular article, or control the sale of the whole supply of a particular
commodity." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1007 (6th ed. 1990). Two or more monopolistic
producers acting in concert comprise a cartel, i.e. "[a] combination of producers of any productjoined together to control its production, sale, and price, so as to obtain a monopoly and restrict
competition in any particular industry or commodity." Id. at 215 (6th ed. 1990).
3. See, e.g., Michael E. Porter, Changing Patterns of International Competition, 28 CAL.
MGMT. REV. 9 (Winter 1986).
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Part I of this Comment discusses the origins of antitrust laws, the
introduction of those laws in the United States, and the international
application of antitrust laws by the United States. Part II explores the
organization and nature of the diamond cartel in order to formulate goals for
this area of law. Part III presents past and current applications of American
antitrust statutes on the diamond cartel. Finally, Part IV discusses solutions
and impediments to the diamond monopoly problem.
I. THE ANTITRUST LAWS4
Antitrust laws have existed for at least a thousand years, dating as far
back as the year 483.1 One famous case that questioned the legality of
monopolies arose in 1602 in what Lord Coke reported as "The Case of the
Monopolies," the case of Darcy v. Allen decided by the King's Bench of
Great Britain.6  The case discussed several early theories as to why
monopolies and cartels should be eliminated: they harm competitors, deprive
others of the ability to practice a trade, and injure the public by advancing
higher prices and poorer quality.7
A. Antitrust Laws in the United States
Theories similar to those expressed in Darcy v. Allen began to develop
in the United States in the second half of the 19th century because of rising
concern over abusive practices by corporate giants.' The American law on
antitrust and restraint of trade soon followed from English common law. 9
4. The efficacy and wisdom of the antitrust laws has long been questioned. See, e.g.,
ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978). This
Comment does not directly enter that debate. Since the antitrust laws currently exist, the focus
is on how those laws can and should be applied against sophisticated foreign companies who deal
in the United States market.
5. THORNTON, supra note 1, § 20, at 32 ("In A.D. 483 Emperor Zeno issued to the
Praetorian Prefect of Constantinople the following edict: 'We command that no one may
presume to exercise a monopoly . . .").
6. Id. § 23, at 36 (identifying Darcy v. Allen, 11 Co. Rep. 84b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260
(K.B. 1602)).
7. Id. at 37.
8. 21 CONG. REC. 2462 ("Can it be that with this vast power Congress can not protect the
people from combinations in restraint of trade that are unlawful by every code of civil law
ad opted by civilized nations?") (statement of Sen. Sherman). See also WILLIAM R. ANDERSEN
& C. PAUL ROGERS Ill, ANTITRUST LAW: POLICY AND PRACTICE § 1.02, at 8 (1985) ("The
statute's popular name, 'The Antitrust Law,' signifies the congressional purpose to declare
unlawful the large and powerful business organizations which wielded essentially unchecked
economic power . . ." (quoting E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW, 125-29, 240-42
(1980)).
9. THORNTON, supra note 1, § 34, at 77.
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Realizing the need to enact and enforce antitrust laws in the United
States,' 0 the United States Government responded to public concern in 1890
by enacting the Sherman Antitrust Act," which prohibited the existence of
monopolies and cartels within the United States. Additional antitrust statutes
have since been enacted to augment perceived gaps in the Sherman Act, and
to regulate anti-competitive economic activity within the country.' 2 The
Department of Justice summarized the purpose of the various United States
antitrust laws as follows:
The U.S. antitrust laws are the foundation of our broad national commit-
ment to competition based on efficiency-to providing consumers with
goods at the lowest price that efficient business operation can justify, and
to allowing enterprises to compete on the basis of their own merit) 3
A private party can bring an antitrust claim to recover treble damages if
it is "injured" in its business or property."' The United States Government
can also enforce the antitrust laws in criminal and civil proceedings through
the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC)."' With respect to international trade, the United States International
Trade Commission is also empowered to act specifically when imports
threaten to violate the Sherman Act.' 6
10. 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890) ("It is to arm the federal courts within the limits of their
constitutional power that they may co-operate with the State courts in checking, curbing, and
controlling the most dangerous combinations that now threaten the business, property and trade
of the people of the United States.") (statement of Sen. Sherman).
11. Enacted July 2, 1890. THORNTON, supra note 1, § 78, at 1. Currently 15 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1-2 (1993).
12. E.g., the Clayton Act of 1914 (prohibited acquisitions of companies that would lessen
trade), the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 (directed FTC to oversee competitive
behavior), the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936 (outlawed price discrimination), and the Celler-
Kefauver Act of 1950 (prohibited acquisitions of company assets that would lessen trade).
13. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 2
(1977).
14. ANDERSEN & ROGERS, supra note 8, § 2.01, at 47.
15. Id. The importance of antitrust laws to the United States can be seen in the
organizational structure of the agencies. The DOJ is composed of several major divisions, one
of which is the Antitrust Division, whose first assigned task is, "[g]eneral enforcement, by
criminal and civil proceedings, of the Federal antitrust laws and other laws relating to the
protection of competition and the prohibition of restraints of trade and monopolization." 28
C.F.R. § 0.40 (1993). Similarly, one of the major divisions of the FTC is the Bureau of
Competition, which is "responsible for enforcing Federal antitrust and trade regulation law under
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the Clayton Act, and a number of other special
statutes which the Commission is charged with enforcing." 16 C.F.R. § 0.16 (1993).
16. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (Supp. 1993). Section (a)(1) allows the Commission to act when
unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles into the United States
threaten to "restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States." 19 U.S.C. §
1337(a)(1)(A)(iii) (Supp. 1993).
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B. International Application of United States Antitrust Laws
Founded on the Interstate Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution, 7 the Sherman Act was enacted in 1890 to eliminate monopo-
lies and their detrimental effects in the United States.8 However, not all
goods sold in the United States were manufactured within its borders;
therefore, the question remained as to whether the laws should be applied to
foreign companies operating outside of the United States that exported goods
into the country. 9
The Sherman Act contains language that sheds some light on that
question. Section 1 provides that: "Every contract, combination ... or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. . . ."I Section 2
further provides that: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony .. .2l Therefore,
by its own terms, the Sherman Antitrust Act also applies to trade with
foreign nations. This appears to be the Congressional intent as expressed by
Senator Sherman when he argued for the enactment of the Sherman Act:
"Unlawful combinations, unlawful at common law, now extend to all the
States and interfere with our foreign and domestic commerce and with the
importation and sale of goods" subject to duty under the laws of the United
States.2 This would suggest that the Act condemns anticompetitive
behavior by foreign companies dealing in American markets.
Thus, the threshold question becomes whether principles of international
law support the application of such a broad statute internationally. To
answer that question, a study of the evolution of the power of a sovereign
state to enforce its laws is helpful.
17. THORNTON, supra note 1, § 63, at 172; § 78, at 196 (Sherman Act founded on U.S.
Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
18. See THORNTON, supra note 1, § 7, at 9-10 (quoting 21 CONG. REc. 2457 (1890)
(statement of Sen. Sherman)).
19. ANDERSEN & ROGERS, supra note 8, § 8.01, at 897. Senator Sherman, however, clearly
saw the Act as being applicable to any foreign company who dared conspire in the trade of
goods in the United States: "It is true that if a crime is committed outside of the United States
it can not be punished in the United States. But if an unlawful combination is made outside of
the United States and in pursuance of it property is brought within the United States such
property is subject to our laws." 21 CONG. REc. 2461 (1890). He stated further, "I do not see
what harm a foreigner can do us if neither his person nor his property is here. He may combine
or conspire to his heart's content if none of his co-conspirators are here or his property is not
here." Id.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890) (emphasis added).
21. Id.
22. 21 CONG. REC. 2456 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman).
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There are three fundamental principles of jurisdiction in international
law.' Under the "territorial principle," a sovereign nation has virtually
complete power to regulate what transpires within its own borders.24 The
"nationality principle" maintains that a sovereign country may prosecute its
own citizens for national crimes committed anywhere in the world. 25
Finally, the "protective principle" dictates that a sovereign nation may,
within in its own jurisdiction, prosecute a foreign citizen for acts that have
taken place abroad in contravention of the sovereign's laws and to the
detriment of the sovereign's citizens.26 Those recognized principles of
international law suggest that a country is free to enact antitrust laws and
assume jurisdiction to enforce those laws within its own borders against: (a)
all persons committing contravening acts within the borders of that country,
(b) its own citizens committing contravening acts within other countries, and
(c) foreign nationals committing contravening acts in a foreign country
against the interests of the sovereign.
The United States Government has not always recognized its power to
enforce antitrust laws internationally, most notably under the protective
principal.27 International trade was a mere novelty in 1890; there was little
thought of regulating antitrust violations on an international scale.2" As
Justice Holmes stated in American Banana Company. v. United Fruit
Company:2 9 "[T]he general and almost universal rule is that the character
of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the
country where the act is done."3 Justice Holmes opinion also illustrated
that the United States was not prepared to exercise the nationality principle
to prosecute United States citizens for violations of American antitrust laws
abroad: "[T]he acts causing the damage were done, so far as appears,
outside the jurisdiction of the United States, and within that of other states.
23. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 402
and 403 (1987).
24. See id. § 402(1) (1987). See also MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 105 (1987).
25. See id. § 402(2) (1987). See also AKEHURST, supra note 24, at 105; United States v.
Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (upholding a Presidential ban on shipments of arms
to Bolivia by United States companies).
26. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§
402(1)(c) and 402(3) (1987). See also The Lotus Case (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A)
No. 10 (upheld jurisdiction of Turkey to try a French sailor for an accident on the high seas in
which Turkish citizens were killed in violation of Turkish law).
27. See generally Barry E. Hawk, International Antitrust Policy and the 1982 Acts: The
Continuing Need For Reassessment, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 201 (1982).
28. Id.
29. 213 U.S. 347 (1909) (Sherman Act not applicable to acts of a United States company
that instigated Costa Rican government to assist in the restraint of trade).
30. Id. at 356 (citing his opinion in Slater v. Mexican National Railroad Co., 194 U.S. 120,
126 (1904)).
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It is surprising to hear it argued that they were governed by the act of Con-
gress. "I'
The language of American Banana stating that the lawfulness of an act
must be determined by the law of the country where the act was done clearly
would bar application of American antitrust laws to companies operating in
foreign nations. The theory was that no antitrust violation occurred if the
noncompetitive activity transpired in a foreign country-even if the ultimate
destination of the goods controlled by the monopoly is the United States.
In 1945, Learned Hand viewed the international implications of the
antitrust laws in a different light. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America (ALCOA), he noted that: "[A]ny state may impose liabilities, even
upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that
has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends; and these
liabilities other states will ordinarily recognize. "32 He then went on to
formulate the classic "effects" antitrust test: "Both agreements would clearly
have been unlawful, had they been made within the United States; and it
follows from what we have just said that both were unlawful, though made
abroad, if they were intended to affect imports and did affect them."33
By 1952, the Supreme Court retreated from its American Banana
position in Steele v. Bulova Watch Co.34 While not explicitly overruling
American Banana, the Court did "explain" that "the holding in that case was
not meant to confer blanket immunity on trade practices which radiate
unlawful consequences here, merely because they were initiated or consum-
mated outside the territorial limits of the United States. 35 In 1962 the
Court further stated in Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide and Carbon
Corp.36 that "A conspiracy to monopolize or restrain the domestic or
foreign commerce of the United States is not outside the reach of the
Sherman Act just because part of the conduct complained of occurs in foreign
countries. "37
Since Learned Hand first formulated the territorial effects test, United
States courts have recognized the test as the basis of extraterritorial
jurisdiction of the United States in antitrust matters. For example, in the
landmark 1976 case, Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, the Ninth
Circuit noted that: "[T]here is the additional question which is unique to the
international setting of whether the interests of, and links to, the United
States-including the magnitude of the effect on American foreign com-
31. Id. at 355.
32. 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945) (L. Hand, J.).
33. Id. at 444.
34. 344 U.S. 280 (1952) (district court had jurisdiction to entertain suit to enjoin United
States company from using plaintiff's trademark on watches assembled in Mexico).
35. Id. at 288 (citing ALCOA with approval).
36. 370 U.S. 690 (1962) (plaintiff allowed to maintain suit against defendants for alleged
monopolistic elimination of suppliers).
37. Id. at 704-05 (again citing ALCOA with approval).
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merce-are sufficiently strong, vis-,-vis those of other nations, to justify an
assertion of extraterritorial authority. 38 There is now wide recognition of
this principle, as stated in the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States:
Any agreement in restraint of United States trade that is made outside of
the United States, and any conduct or agreement in restraint of such trade
that is carried out predominately outside of the United States, are subject
to the jurisdiction to prescribe of the United States, if a principle purpose
of the conduct or agreement is to interfere with the commerce of the
United States, and the agreement or conduct has some effect on that com-
merce. 
39
The U.S. Supreme Court now believes that United States antitrust laws
unquestionably apply to foreign activity. As Justice Souter explained in his
1993 decision in Hartford Fire Insurance Company v. California:'
"Although the proposition was perhaps not always free from doubt, . .. it
is well established by now that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct
that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in
the United States." 4' The application of the United States antitrust statutes
to foreign companies that export goods into the United States has come full
circle since the Congressional debates on the Sherman Act. United States
courts now recognize that the Sherman Act extends to any monopolistic act
conducted in a foreign country that affects the domestic trade of the United
States .42
That is not to say, however, that United States antitrust laws are
vigorously enforced against all international industries. For instance, one
case of international monopolistic behavior remains in the diamond
industry.43 That industry is essentially dominated by one group, the De
38. 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976).
39. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 415(2)
(1987). Some countries, however, protest the assertion of U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction. See,
e.g. WILBUR L. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS, § 2.16 at 111
(1991); GARY B. BORN & DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED
STATES COURTS 445-47 (1989).
40. 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993) (district court should not have refused to exercise Sherman Act
jurisdiction over foreign reinsurers under principles of international comity).
41. Id. at 2909. See also Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 582 n.6 (1986) (United States companies failed to establish that Japanese manufacturers
entered into an illegal conspiracy which caused cognizable injury to United States firms);
ALCOA, 148 F.2d at 444 (United States firm guilty of antitrust violations as evidenced by its
monopolistic position in aluminum production market).
42. Continental Ore, 370 U.S. at 704. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 415 (1987).
43. DAVID E. KOSKOFF, THE DIAMOND WORLD 6, 325 (1981). This Comment relies
heavily on four major works dealing with De Beers and the diamond cartel: KOSKOFF, supra;
EDWARD J. EPSTEIN, THE RISE & FALL OF DIAMONDS (1982); MURRAY SCHUMACH, THE
DIAMOND PEOPLE (1981); and STEFAN KANFER, THE LAST EMPIRE: DE BEERS, DIAMONDS,
AND THE WORLD (1993). At the time the books were published, Kanfer was an editor and
critic for Time magazine and several journals, Schumach was a recently retired reporter after
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Beers diamond cartel, which controls the supply of most diamonds mined and
sold in the world." If the diamond cartel is indeed monopolizing the trade
of diamonds in the United States, the antitrust laws can and should be
enforced against them-just as they would against any national industry.
II. GOALS IN APPLYING UNITED STATES ANTITRUST
LAWS TO THE DIAMOND CARTEL
In order to formulate the goals to be achieved through the application of
United States antitrust laws to the diamond cartel, it is essential to define the
nature of the diamond industry. The wide reach and influence of monopoli-
zation in the industry must be examined. The organization that controls the
cartel, De Beers, must also be examined in order to fully understand the
significance of its role within the industry.
A. The Monopolization of the Diamond Industry
People are generally familiar with two of the most precious commodities
in the world today, gold and diamonds. Purchasers of diamond rings would
likely be surprised to learn the cost of the diamond compared to that of the
gold frame. Contrasting pure gold to "D-Flawless" diamonds-the finest and
rarest of the various grades of diamonds-illustrates an intriguing dispari-
ty.' 5 As of January 7, 1994, D-Flawless round diamonds were trading
wholesale at an average of $15,500 for a one-carat stone. 46 One troy ounce
of one-carat D-Flawless diamonds would thus cost $2,418,000.' 7 In
comparison, one troy ounce of pure gold was trading for $389 at the same
time!4" What can account for such a wide difference in prices?49
forty years with the New York Times, Epstein was a professor of political science who wrote
widely on international politics and business, and Koskoff was a practicing attorney.
44. KOSKOFF, supra note 43, at 6; EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 157.
45. KOSKOFF, supra note 43, at 2-3. Diamonds are graded by two sets of letters. The first
letter refers to the color of the diamond: D (the best-colorless) through Z (the worst-light
V ellow). The second set of letters refers to the clarity of the diamond: IF (Internally Flawless),
VS1 (Very Very Small Inclusions 1), VVS2, VS1 (Very Small Inclusions 1), VS2, S1 (Small
Inclusions 1), S12, S13, I1 (Imperfect 1), 12, 13. The "D-Flawless diamond" would therefore
be categorized as either D-IF. Note: The purchase price of a diamond is also influenced by its
carat-weight (weight of the diamond measured in carats), how it is cut (which influences how
the diamond handles light), and its shape (e.g., brilliant or round, marquise, pear, heart, oval,
emerald, and baguette).
46. RAPAPORT DIAMOND REPORT, Jan. 7, 1994, at 24. Note that the price reflects an
opinion of New York asking prices. Id. at 23. Also, the listed prices ranged depending on the
ultimate size of the stone purchased, i.e. a .01-carat D-IF stone was trading at $910 per carat,
a .50-carat for $8000 per carat, a 1-carat for $15,500 per carat, and a 5-carat for $55,000 per
carat. Id. at 23-24. The prices listed are for round diamonds; "fancy" shape stones are priced
even higher. Id. at 25-26. Finally, the prices do not reflect dealer mark-up, which can range
from 50% on a high-priced item to 140% for a low-priced item. Id. at 5.
47. There are 156 one-carat diamonds in one troy ounce. KOSKOFF, supra note 43, at 3.
$15,500 x 156 = $2.4M.
48. WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 1994, at C1.
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The answer to that question lies in the monopolization of the diamond
industry by one company, De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd."0 According
to one commentator, diamonds are a "multibillion dollar business revolving
around an attractive pebble that has an intrinsic [actual] value of from $2 to
$30 a carat. It's higher value in the marketplace is principally an artificial
one, attributable mostly to the strong hand of De Beers that keeps up the
price."'" The result: "Today De Beers is very likely the most cash-rich
business entity in the world."52 As a company, De Beers is considered as
powerful as some nations:
De Beers feeds out the goods at such rate as it determines, at whatever
price it dictates, to whichever of the thousands of diamond-cutting
enterprises it favors. It decides the fate of the diamond-processing industry
in every country in which there is one, and whether any other countries
will have significant processing industries ... it has the power to move
nations and a grim willingness to use it.1
3
1. Corporate Structure of De Beers
De Beers Consolidated Mines, started in 1888, owes its monopolistic
roots to its founder, Ernest Oppenheimer, and his son Harry. 4 De Beers
as an organization is a complex corporate group directed by two parent
corporations: De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited, incorporated in South
Africa, and De Beers Centenary AG, incorporated in Switzerland.' The
later corporation was formed in 1990, when the shareholders of De Beers
Consolidated Mines rearranged the company so that a Swiss company would
49. A casual reader may attribute it to the physical properties of the objects, i.e the fact that
gold can be melted down and combined to increase its size, whereas a diamond must be taken
as it is found and (because of the cutting and polishing process) can only be reduced in size.
If this conclusion were true, diamonds prices would not have to be artificially controlled.
50. De Beers is now a large conglomerate controlled by the principal parents, De Beers
Consolidated Mines, Ltd and De Beers Centenary AG. See Part H(A)(1), infra, for a discussion
of the De Beers corporate group structure.
51. KOSKOFF, supra note 43, at 7. The De Beers Central Selling Organization sold $4.36
billion in rough diamonds in 1993, its best year ever. RAPAPORT DIAMOND REPORT, Jan. 7,
1994, at 1. See Part H(A)(i), infra, for a discussion of the organizational structure of De Beers.
52. KOSKOFF, supra note 43, at 28.
53. Id. at 6.
54. Id. at 21-22. See also EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 17. Despite being a publicly traded
company, note 250, infra, to this day De Beers is considered a family firm. KOSKOFF, supra
note 43, at 27-28. There were four Oppenheimers on both the De Beers Consolidated Mines
and De Beers Centenary AG Board of Directors in 1992. DE BEERS CENTENARY AG / DE
BEERS CONSOLIDATED MINES LIMITED, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT 21, 57 (1993) [hereinafter DE
BEERS REPORT]. BNA reported that the Oppenheimer family also has a number of its "close
associates" on the board of the company. Gold Producer Fails to Substitute Hold Separate
Order for Injunction, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), No. 1414 (May 4, 1989).
55. De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd., the principal parent, was first registered on 12
March 1888. DE BEERS REPORT, supra note 54, at 23. The company was split to form a
second parent, De Beers Centenary AG, on 23 March 1990. Id. at 58.
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"conduct the foreign business of the De Beers group. ,56 The companies are
so intertwined that they share a common annual report and Board of
Directors,57 and trade their shares as a linked unit.5"
The De Beers group also consists of various subsidiary corporations,
structured under one of the two parents and formed in various countries. In
1992, De Beers characterized the "major subsidiaries" of the parents as
follows:
De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited 9
Subsidiary Company Incorporated In Percentage Held
Debex Limited South Africa 100%
Ultra High Pressure Units Limited South Africa 50%
The Diamond Corporation Limited South Africa 100%
De Beers Industrial Diamond Division South Africa 100%
Orama Holding Limited South Africa 100%
De Beers Holdings Limited South Africa 100%
Sea Diamond Corporation Limited South Africa 100%
De Beers Marine Limited South Africa 100%
De Beers Industrial Diamonds Limited South Africa 100%
Griqualand West Diamond Mining Company South Africa 73%
Finsch Diamonds Limited South Africa 80%
Consolidated Company Bultfontein Mine South Africa 68%
Premier Diamond Mining Company Limited South Africa 100%
Olivia Properties Limited South Africa 100%
Theta Properties North Limited South Africa 100%
Theta Properties South Limited South Africa 100%
De Beers Services Limited Namibia 100%
Marine Diamond Corporation Limited Namibia 100%
Marine Group Investments Limited Namibia 100%
De Beers Prospecting Botswana Limited Botswana 100%
56. Id. at 22.
57. See, e.g., id. Their Boards of Directors have the same members, with the exception that
De Beers Consolidated Mines has two additional members (19 versus 17 members). Id. at 21,
57.
58. See STANDARD AND POOR'S CORPORATION, STOCK REPORTS-OVER THE COUNTER AND
REGIONAL EXCHANGES (1993) (report number 3664); DE BEERS REPORT, supra note 54, at 36,
69.
59. DE BEERS REPORT, supra note 54, at 54.
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De Beers Centenary A G6
Subsidiary Company Incorporated In Percentage Held
Centenary Holdings Luxembourg 100%
DCS Corporation AG Switzerland 100%
Scandiamant AB Sweden 50%
Debid Limited Australia 100%
The Diamond Corporation Botswana Limited Botswana 100%
De Beers Industrial Diamond Division (Ireland) Ireland 100%
De Beers Industrial Diamonds (Ireland) Ireland 100%
International Diamond Products Ireland 50%
Ultra High Pressure Systems (Ireland) Ireland 50%
Ultra High Pressure Units (Ireland) Ireland 50%
De Beers Industrial Diamonds (Japan) Limited Japan 100%
CDM Limited Namibia 100%
CDM Properties Limited Namibia 100%
Exclusive Properties Limited Namibia 100%
CDM Prospecting Limited Namibia 100%
Namib Finance Corporation Limited Namibia 100%
It is interesting that in each case De Beers stated the percentages as those
"held directly or indirectly."61  Also, the De Beers group consists of
numerous "associated companies" and has scores of "listed" and "unlisted
investments" in still other companies, not to mention its virtual control of the
immense Anglo American Corporation.62 It is therefore impossible to
60. Id. at 82.
61. Id. at 54, 82. For example, Luxembourg-based Minorco, S.A. is not listed. BNA
reported that Anglo American Corporation of South Africa, De Beers, and the Oppenheimer
family own about 67% of Minorco. Lapse of Minorco's Bid Prompts Participants to Reappraise
Stances, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), No. 1418 (June 1, 1989); Target Has Standing
to Challenge Attempted Takeover Under Clayton Act Section 7, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA), No. 1409 (Mar. 30, 1989). See infra note 61 regarding the connection between De
Beers and Anglo American.
62. DE BEERS REPORT, supra note 54, at 51-53, 81. Standard and Poor's states that its
principal investment is a 38.6% holding in Anglo American Corporation of South Africa, one
of the world's largest mining groups. STANDARD AND POOR'S CORPORATION, STOCK RE-
PORTS-OVER THE COUNTER AND REGIONAL EXCHANGES (1993) (report number 3664). In 1992
De Beers Centenary AG confirmed the 38.6% interest. DE BEERS REPORT, supra note 54, at
22, 53. Anglo American, on the other hand, holds a 32.5% voting interest in De Beers
Consolidated. Id. at 37. The Anglo / De Beers group controls over 1,300 business, including
financial houses, breweries, vineyards, automobile assembly plants, explosive factories, travel
agencies, paper manufacturers, farms, copper and coal mines, and the world's largest platinum
mine." Peter Fuhrman, Harry Oppenheimer, African Empire Builder, Is Smiling Again, FORBES,
Sept. 16, 1991, at 130. KANFER, supra note 43, at 5, 8. Anglo and De Beers also share the
same corporate headquarters, located at 44 Main Street in Johannesburg, South Africa. The
Oppenheimer Empire: South Africa's Family Affair, ECONOMIST, July 1, 1989, at 59. KANFER,
supra note 43, at 268. Regarding a recent unsuccessful attempt by De Beers to control an even
larger share of the gold market, see Consolidated Gold Fields, PLC v. Anglo-American Corp.
of South Africa, Ltd., 698 F. Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom.
Consolidated Gold Fields, PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1989) (hostile takeover
of Consolidated Gold Fields by De Beers interests prevented on antitrust grounds); KANFER,
supra note 43. at 360-68. FUGATE, supra note 39, § 6.4, at 449-50 (also claiming De Beers
controls the world's largest gold producers); Gold Producer's Eleventh-Hour Effort Fails to
11
Montpelier: Diamonds are Forever? Implications of United States Antitrust Sta
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1994
288 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
determine the actual number of intermediary companies and the pseudonyms
involved.
The marketing arm of the De Beers group is known as the Central
Selling Organization (CSO), whose function is explained in detail in Part
11(2), infra.63  The London-based CSO as an organization is jointly
controlled by both parents: De Beers Centenary AG consists of "De Beers'
former interests in the elements situated outside South Africa of the Central
Selling Organization," whereas De Beers Consolidated Mines controls "the
interests in the South African elements of the Central Selling Organiza-
tion."64
The problems such complex organizational arrangements and character-
izations can have on enforcement actions cannot be over-emphasized.
Consider the example of the Diamond Trading Company, Ltd. (DTC). The
DTC was indicted in the first DOJ antitrust case against the De Beers
group. 65 Commentators claim that De Beers is referred to as the DTC in
Western countries.' The trade publication of the United States diamond
industry refers to the DTC in connection with De Beers. 67 The problem?
"Diamond Trading Company" is not listed in any financial statement
contained in the 1992 De Beers annual report. It cannot be defunct because
the diamond report was issued after the annual report. It must therefore be
either an unreported subsidiary, an associated company, or an investment; or,
it must be the pseudonym of some other company whether reported or not.
Perhaps it is the pseudonym of a reported associated company of which De
Beers Consolidated Mines owns 50%: "The Diamond Purchasing and
Trading Company (Proprietary) Limited. 68  If that is the case, and the
name was not subsequently changed, the complexity of the problem is
illustrated by the fact that the DOJ indicted a company under a pseudonym.
Undue Roadblock to Takeover, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), No. 1418 (June 1, 1989)(also noting that the "Anglo group" is the largest gold producer in the non-communist world
with 20.3% of production). In conjunction with the De Beers interest, some claim the
Oppenheimer family controls the company. KOSKOFF, supra note 43, at 29-30. KANFER, supra
note 43, at 5. BNA also reported that the Oppenheimer family "has a number of its members
and close associates" on the board of the company. Gold Producer Fails to Substitute Hold
Separate Order for Injunction, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), No. 1414 (May 4, 1989).
The district court in Consolidated Gold Fields stated that "E. Oppenheimer & Sons Limited, a
company allegedly controlled by Oppenheimer, owns 8.2% of Anglo outright." 698 F. Supp.
at 491.
63. According to two commentators, in addition to the DTC, note 66, supra, De Beers is
also known as the CSO in Western countries. See EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 12; KOSKOFF,
supra note 43, at 6.
64. DE BEERS REPORT, supra note 54, at 22, 58. See also Steve Coil, Asian Prosperity
Spawns Conspicuous Consumption Middle Class Buying Up Consumer Goods, WASH. POST,
Mar. 22, 1994, at A01 (The CSO is based at 17 Charterhouse Street in London).
65. See Part III(A), infra, for a description of the case.
66. See EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 12; KOSKOFF, supra note 43, at 6. The DTC is also
claimed to share the same office with the CSO, supra note 64. The Oppenheimer Empire:
South Africa's Family Affair, ECONOMIST, July 1, 1989, at 59.
67. RAPAPORT DIAMOND REPORT, Jan. 7, 1994, at 13, 18-19.
68. DE BEERS REPORT, supra note 54, at 53.
[Vol. 24
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2. De Beers and the Diamond Industry
De Beers mines 30% of the world's total caratage of diamonds, and is
the selling vehicle for most of the world's other diamond producers through
its CSO.69 As a result, De Beers and its subsidiaries control some 80% of
the world's output of gem-quality diamonds,7' giving them an obvious and
powerful hold on the diamond industry.7
What of the remaining "uncontrolled" percentage of diamond output?
"Other than De Beers, the great producers are now all controlled by
governments: Sierra Leone, the [former] Soviet Union, Zaire, Angola, and
Tanzania. It is the cooperation of each that gives De Beers its monopoly
power in the diamond world. "' As for the former Soviet Union, on July
25, 1990, the now defunct central government signed a controversial five-
year contract granting De Beers exclusive distributor rights for the entire
rough diamond supply of Russia.73 For the most part, the communist and
former-communist countries deal only with De Beers.74 While some would
like to alter those arrangements, it has been noted that "no major producer
has successfully broken ranks altogether with the CSO."
75
"Control of output" is only one part of the diamond equation, demand
being the other. For De Beers, control of both supply and demand is the
best insurance to keep the price of diamonds high.76 "Both sides of the
equation are manipulable and manipulated to keep diamonds 'rare' in the
69. KOSKOFF, supra note 43, at 6.
70. De Beers claims that it "markets around 80 per cent of the world's diamond
production." DE BEERS REPORT, supra note 54, at 12 (1993). See also Robert C. Toth,
Strapped Soviets 'Dwnp'.Diamonds On World Market, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 20, 1984, at 8A
(quotes the 80 per cent figure from the United States Department of Mines). Kanfer places the
figure at 90%. KANFER, supra note 43, at 8, 368. See Part II(A)(l), supra, for a discussion
of De Beers subsidiary companies.
71. Elisabeth Rubinfien, Russia's Diamond Industry Is Debating Loosening Marketing Ties
to De Beers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 1994, at All (De Beers maintains control by contracting
with most of the producing countries. "Diamond producers who work with De Beers generally
agree to sell all of their diamonds through [De Beers] under a system known as 'single-channel
marketing.' De Beers mixes diamonds from around the world into assortments for buyers and
releases only as many as it calculates won't disrupt prices.").
72. KOSKOFF, supra note 43, at 71.
73. See Soviet Loan Stands-De Beers, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1990, at P3; Russia
Challenges Soviet Government on Diamond Exports, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 12, 1990 at 69;
Leslie Shepherd, Russian Republic Says Soviet Contracts Invalid, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Aug.
12, 1990, at A4. See also KANFER, supra note 43, at 369-370. Standard and Poor's states that
the contract was between De Beers Centenary (the second parent) and the Rosalmazzoloto, the
Russian diamond authority. STANDARD AND POOR'S CORPORATION, STOCK REPORTS-OVER
THE COUNTER AND REGIONAL EXCHANGES (1993) (report number 3664).
74. See EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 17-19, 115-116, 183-198; KOSKOFF, supra note 43, at
94-98. See also Steven Mufson, The Rocks And a Hard Place-De Beers Worried Over Russian
Gems, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1992, at Fl.
75. See Russia Challenges Soviet Government on Diamond Exports, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug.
12, 1990, at 69; Canadian Diamond Mines May Lead to a Challenge of the De Beers System,
CHIC. TRiB., Feb. 14, 1994, at 8.
76. KOSKOFF, supra note 43, at 127.
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meaningful sense: valuable." ' It is astonishing how effectively De Beers
is able to control both supply and demand.
On the supply side, the De Beers "Diamond Trading Company [DTC]
decides what to supply and how much to supply, whom to supply, when to
supply, and where to supply [and, of course, the price of the supply]."78
As De Beers itself admits, during times of diamond market setbacks, its
policy is to "maintain price stability by adjusting supplies to its clients...
while maintaining its purchases from producers at a reasonable level in terms
of quota arrangements." 79  Indeed, De Beers speaks with pride when
discussing its horizontal hold over world suppliers:
The year under review was a testing one for De Beers and the whole
diamond industry. That we should have come through it with stability
restored in the market and, indeed, with a small price increase in February
this year, is proof again of the efficacy of De Beers' system of marketing
rough diamonds through a single channel, and of the major world
producers' commitment to that system. It is especially in such times that
the Central Selling Organization (CSO) fulfills the function for which it
was created, and proves its worth not only to producers but to all the other
sections of the industry that benefit from its stabilising [sic] role.'
As for the demand for gem-quality diamonds by the general populace,
many contend that there is none beyond that created by De Beers." l For
77. Id. at 272.
78. Id. at 126. See EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 59-65. See also Francesca Chapman,
Industry Virtual Monopoly De Beers Holds 80 % of World Supply, PHILADELPHIA DAILY NEWS,
Feb. 7, 1994 at 24 ("A recent edition of PBS's 'Frontline' reported that fewer than 200
wholesalers have the right to buy diamonds from De Beers. By controlling the mines and
restricting the flow of diamonds, the documentary reported, the cartel is able to keep diamond
prices artificially high"). The process of the initial diamond sale in London is as follows: "The
world's diamond supply is transported from mine heads to [CSO offices located at] Charterhouse
Street, where it is sorted, valued and then resold to an invitation-only group of diamond cutters
and wholesalers known as 'sightholders.' The sightholders in turn produce finished loose
diamonds or diamond jewelry and sell these to manufacturers, retailers or the public." Steve
Coil, Asian Prosperity Spawns Conspicuous Conswption Middle Class Buying Up Conswner
Goods, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 1994, at A01. See also Part II(A)(1), supra, regarding the DTC
and its relation to De Beers.
79. DE BEERS REPORT, supra note 54, at 12. Because of the ties De Beers has to Anglo
American, this language in the annual report was persuasive evidence to the district court in
Consolidated Gold Mines that antitrust violations could occur if an injunction were not issued
to stop the stock trading of the hostile takeover target. 698 F. Supp. at 501.
80. DE BEERS REPORT, supra note 54, at 3 (statement of J. Ogilvie Thompson, Chairman).
81. See, e.g. EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 9-13; Patricia McLaughlin, Marketing is Forever,
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, June 9, 1985, at 35. Interest in gem-quality diamonds by more
affluent groups has, however, existed for quite some time. See e.g. KANFER, supra note 43,
8-11. Knowledge of diamonds has existed since biblical times, and ladies of nobility have worn
diamonds since at least 1396. S. TOLANSKY, THE HISTORY AND USE OF DIAMONDS 13-17, 85-
87 (1962). Diamonds were also used in the highest degrees of state orders and decorations. For
example, in 1714 Peter the Great founded the diamond-studded Order of Saint Catherine The
Great Martyr as an award to female nobility. ROBERT WERLICH, ORDERS AND DECORATIONS
OF ALL NATIONS, ANCIENT AND MODERN, CIVIL AND MILITARY 363-64 (2d ed. 1974).
Similarly, in 1861 Queen Victoria of Great Britain instituted The Most Exalted Order of the Star
of India which contained diamonds, followed in 1878 by the Imperial Order of the Crown of
[Vol. 24
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instance, it coined the popular slogans "A Diamond is Forever" and "The
anniversary gift that says you'd marry her all over again."' Credited with
developing the international diamond engagement ring tradition,84 De Beers
suggests that several months' salary should be spent on a diamond ring to
show affection properly.' De Beers itself brazenly boasts of its ability to
create and sustain demand:
Through the work of its Consumer and Advertising Division, De Beers'
success in establishing the image of diamonds as the ultimate gift of love
is highlighted by the almost universal recognition of the slogan 'A diamond
is forever.' There can be few companies that have mounted and sustained
for over half a century a worldwide consumer campaign on behalf of an
entire industry.'
The De Beers "control of output" is simply a complete monopolistic
control of the vast majority of the diamond industry. 7 De Beers' control
of diamonds, which encompasses both the supply and demand sides of the
equation, has been most effective. "The [De Beers] DTC has been more
successful than most central bankers or finance ministers, none of whom can
claim to have preserved the value of their currency for as long a period as
the DTC can boast: Diamond prices have increased steadily since 1934,
India, an award bearing diamonds and pearls for ladies of nobility. Id. at 203, 205. Also, in
1889 (one year after the birth of De Beers) King Wilhelm II of Prussia awarded
Generalfeldmarschall Helmuth von Moltke the Crown and Diamonds device to his Pour le
Mdrite. JOHN R. ANGOLIA & CLINT R. HACKNEY, JR., THE POUR LE MtRITE AND GERMANY'S
FIRST ACES 70 (1984).
82. KANFER, supra note 43, at 271-72 (noting that diamonds are not forever, but can be
shattered, chipped, or burned). Koskoff, supra note 43, at 273. See also EPSTEIN, supra note
43, at 128. The phrase was coined in 1948. De Beers made the phrase a "Diamond is Forever"
the company logo in 1949.
83. KOSKOFF, supra note 43, at 275.
84. Id. See also EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 133. KANFER, supra note 43, at 271-72.
85. See Patricia McLaughlin, Marketing is Forever, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, June 9, 1985,
at 35.
86. DE BEERS REPORT, supra note 54, at 10. Additionally, De Beers noted that, "[iun 1993
the Consumer and Advertising Division is set to create an even more powerful impact globally
through the enhanced use of television. This powerful medium has been selected as the ideal
vehicle for the exciting new 'Shadows' advertising campaign. 'Shadows', launched in Europe
in 1992, is being shown in more than 20 countries and will be seen by over 300 million potential
purchasers of diamond jewellery [sic]." Id. at 11. De Beers is also active in introducing the
diamond myth to developing countries. As expressed by one commentator: "The challenge
facing Mehta's Suraj Diamonds (India) Ltd. and his backers at the De Beers international
diamond cartel is to persuade 400 million-plus Indian women, many of them trapped by lonely,
arranged marriages and feudal family values, that diamonds are their best friend." Steve Coil,
Asian Prosperity Spawns Conspicuous Consumption Middle Class Buying Up Consumer Goods,
WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 1994, at A01. De Beers even coined a new slogan for the Asian
marketing campaign: "For Me. For Now. Forever." Id. "In marking terms, the slogan is a
spearhead of the diamond cartel's accelerating campaign to conquer Asia's dynamic consumer
culture." Id.
87. See EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 9-11.
15
Montpelier: Diamonds are Forever? Implications of United States Antitrust Sta
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1994
292 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
without suffering significant setbacks.""8 That, according to De Beers, is
precisely the goal: "Stability has always been recognized as essential to the
diamond industry . . . because the price fluctuations that are accepted as
normal in the case of most raw materials would destroy public confidence in
the value of gem diamonds, which in terms of consumer spending are a
luxury. "89
It is considered common knowledge throughout the precious gem world
that most of the world's diamond trade occurs in New York and Los
Angeles.9' As De Beers controls the majority of the diamond trade, it is
also pervasively known that this family business controls the American
diamond market with its exports. 91 De Beers itself admits that "Retail sales
of jewellery [sic] in 1992 were strongest in the US."' As one author
describes diamond trading in America, "The industry thrives in a frenzy of
competition, but lives in the long shadow of the omnipotent South African
monopoly-the De Beers Syndicate-that long ago set the pattern for multina-
tional cartels." 93 The result of De Beers' efforts have been astonishing. By
controlling the production and distribution of diamonds-in conjunction with
the psychological probing of consumer minds that underlies its advertis-
ing-De Beers was able to elicit $2.1 billion, at the wholesale level, from the
American people in one year alone. 94
The "true" value of the diamonds purchased by the American public,
however, is alarming. When it comes time to resell their diamonds, buyers
find that they are worth only a fraction of the original cost. 95 The De Beers
advertising stories, suggesting that diamonds are valuable (and thus can be
resold for enormous prices), are extremely misleading. 96 In fact, people are
psychologically inhibited from attempting to sell their diamonds, for, if they
did, the price of diamonds would most likely collapse.' In summary, after
88. KOSKOFF, supra note 43, at 130. Indeed, several authors suggest that diamonds, unlike
any other commodity, beat inflation because of De Beers' success. See SCHUMACH, supra note
43, at 191-211 (1981); EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 12. The problem is that they can never be
sold for what they are worth because of the De Beers diamond cartel, i.e. all diamond dealers
are afraid to buy quality gems from anyone other than De Beers. See EPSTEIN, supra note 43,
at 229-237. See also Part II(A)(1), supra, regarding the DTC and its relation to De Beers.
89. DE BEERS REPORT, supra note 54, at 12.
90. KOSKOFF, supra note 43, at 263. See also EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 199 ("[M]ost of
the diamonds in the world are sold to American customers.") The initial sale of the diamonds
to wholesalers, however, occurs in London. See supra note 78.
91. See EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 57; SCHUMACH, supra note 43, at 104.
92. DE BEERS REPORT, supra note 54, at 4.
93. SCHUMACH, supra note 43, at 14.
94. EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 138-39 (De Beers sold $2.1 billion dollars in wholesale
diamonds in the United States in 1979).
95. Id. at 237.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 252-53. See also Betty Lee, Stone-cold choices; Diamonds May Be an Investor's
Best Friend, But Only After You've Cracked the Market's Decidedly Icy Surface, CANADIAN
BUSINESS, Nov. 1986, at 169 ("It's no secret in the trade that the [De Beers] cartel has always
discouraged the sale of diamonds for investment on the theory (which was eventually proven
(Vol. 24
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creating a market for their goods, De Beers artificially manipulates both
prices and supply to obtain the maximum amount of money it can from the
consumer. 9
8
B. Goals of Antitrust Law
The DOJ perfectly stated the goal of antitrust law with respect to the
diamond cartel in its 1977 Antitrust Guidelines for International Operations:
Antitrust enforcement by the United States Government has two major
purposes with respect to international commerce. The first is to protect the
American consuming public by assuring it the benefit of competitive
products and ideas produced by foreign competitors as well as domestic
competitors. Competition by foreign producers is particularly important
when imports are or could be a major source for a particular product, or
where the domestic industry is dominated by a single firm or a few firms.
An agreement or set of private agreements designed to raise the price of
such imports or to exclude them from the domestic market raises most
serious antitrust concerns. . . . In general, foreign firms, including state-
owned and controlled firms, will be expected to observe the prohibitions
of our antitrust laws, and to benefit from enforcement of those laws in the
same manner as domestically incorporated enterprises. 99
There can be but one primary goal in this area of law: fair application
of the antitrust statutes against international cartels. The statutes must be
enforced against all monopolistic firms that harm the American public; and,
if necessary, additional legislation must be enacted to achieve that end.
Despite the international implications, it is important that the United States
also protect the American public and American companies from monopolistic
foreign firms which, directly or indirectly, import goods into the United
States at unrealistic prices. The DOJ agrees:
To protect U.S. consumer welfare, however, the Department's enforcement
efforts must sometimes reach foreign defendants and conduct that arguably
occurs outside the territorial limits of the United States. For example, an
international cartel of private producers cannot agree to impose higher
prices on U.S. consumers with impunity simply by holding its cartel
meetings outside the United States. OF
This logic would seem to include the conduct of De Beers. Unfortunate-
ly, the De Beers syndicate may not appreciate the quest for fairness and
correct) that buying and selling for profit would cause violent price fluctuations"; thus, De Beers
engages in advertising to convince consumers that diamonds "should never be resold.")
98. KOSKOFF, supra note 43, at 277-78.
99. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 4-5, 9
(1977).
100. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL
OPERATIONS 1 (1988).
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justice. As one expert noted: "In its quest for power and profit, the
Syndicate will, if it can, ignore the laws of other nations, even of a country
as powerful as the United States." 10 1 Dealing with such an organization
with enough wealth to secure the best legal resources in the world has, and
will continue to be, a difficult problem for the United States. Nevertheless,
the United States will have to surmount these challenges if it ever hopes to
ultimately solve the De Beers problem.
III. UNITED STATES V. THE DE BEERS GROUP
The United States has confronted the De Beers monopoly twice and is
in the process of confronting it a third time."°  After analyzing those
cases, current United States antitrust law will be analyzed to judge the
potential success of a wide scale fourth attempt.
A. The First Response to Diamond Monopolization°3
DEBEERS I
The DOJ first began investigating the diamond monopoly in the early
1940's when Mr. Oppenheimer refused to stockpile large amounts of rough
diamonds in Canada for American war production."°  Not only was De
Beers in a position to impede the war effort, but there was also considerable
concern that De Beers was "playing both sides of the fence" by supplying
both the Allied and Axis powers. °5 The DOJ concluded in 1944 that
"[t]he United States is paying monopoly prices for an essential material
101. SCHUMACH, supra note 43, at 80-81; see also KOSKOFF, supra note 43, at 324-25;
EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 199-210.
102. Two related antitrust cases deserve mention. The first was a civil case filed by the
DOJ: United States v. Diamond Dealers Club, Inc., and Diamond Center, Inc., 1955 Trade
Cas. (CCH), 67,987 (No. Civ. 76-343 S.D.N.Y. filed June 23, 1953), discussed in Part
ImI(D)(I), infra, dealt with diamond dealers. The case is not covered in this section because no
De Beers parent or subsidiary was a named party. The second case was filed by a private party
against two De Beers affiliates: In Consolidated Gold Fields, supra note 62, a hostile takeover
of Consolidated Gold Fields by De Beers affiliates was prevented on antitrust grounds. The case
is not covered in detail because it does not deal directly with the issue of De Beers' influence
on the United States diamond market. See supra notes 61-62 for a discussion of the relationship
between De Beers and the affiliates.
103. United States v. De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd., Diamond Corporation, Ltd.,
Diamond Trading Co., Ltd., Societe Generale de Belgique, Societe Miniere du Beceka, Societe
Internationale Forestiere et Minere Du Congo, Companhia De Diamantes de Angola,
Consolidated African Selection Trust, Ltd., Sierra Leone Selection Trust, Ltd., Russell Johnson
Parker, Lute J. Parkinson, Herbert H. Breeland, Albert E. Thiele, Solomon R. Guggenheim,
Glendenin J. Ryan and George K. Sturm, 1948-1949 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,248 (No. Civ. 29-
446, S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 29, 1945).
104. EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 90-91, 199. See also KANFER, supra note 43, at 228-29.
105. EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 93-96. See also KANFER, supra note 43, at 229-30.
18
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 24, No. 2 [1994], Art. 6
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol24/iss2/6
1994] U.S. ANTITRUST STATUTES AND INT'L DIAMOND TRADE 295
needed in wartime production " " and that, had De Beers been a United
States company, the antitrust laws would have been violated. 07
Since De Beers was a South African corporation, however, the DOJ was
forced to find some basis of jurisdiction over the activities of De Beers
before it could prosecute. "Is The FBI interviewed leading New York
diamond dealers to verify that De Beers transacted business in the United
States, but was confronted with secrecy by insiders in the domestic diamond
industry."° While the DOJ discovered that all transactions with American
dealers occurred in London,' it relied mainly upon the existence of a
number of bank accounts in New York "maintained for the purpose of
paying for advertising, publicity, public relations work, and purchases of
machinery, tools and supplies"; "extensive and expensive" advertising and
publicity campaigns in the United States conducted by an advertising agency
on behalf of De Beers; the sporadic sale of diamonds by De Beers in the
United States; that representative of De Beers visited the United States; and
that De Beers affiliates maintained an office, made substantial purchases, and
arranged export licenses."'
A civil suit was brought against the De Beers parent company and
several affiliated companies charging them with "an unlawful combination
and conspiracy restraining foreign commerce" in the United States "in
industrial and gem diamonds, in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust and
Wilson Tariff Acts."1 2  As one of the results of the conspiracy, the DOJ
specifically alleged that the United States was "prevented from accumulating
a stockpile of industrial diamonds . . .for military purposes.""'
Jurisdiction eventually fell through, and the case was dismissed in
1948.' 14 The district court found that the maintenance of bank accounts
which were used to facilitate transactions within the district were merely
incidental to the main business of the defendants, and that the purchase of
equipment, the maintenance of an office, and the carrying on of an extensive
advertising campaign in the district by De Beers affiliates did not warrant a
finding that defendants were "doing business" in the district so as to be liable
106. EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 92 (quoting the Justice Department indictment).
107. Id. at 93.
108. EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 93.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. 1948-1949 Trade Cas. (CCH), 62,248. See also De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd.,
et. al. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212 (1945) (DOJ sought injunction to restrain defendants from
removing assets in banks and other property from United States. The Court held that the
preliminary injunction was improperly entered because, under the Sherman Act and the Wilson
Tariff Act, the district court had no jurisdiction in the suit to enter a money judgment); 1944-
1947 Trade Cas. (CCH), 57,373; 1944-1947 Trade Cas. (CCH) 57,354.
112. 1944-1947 Trade Cas. (CCH), 53,354.
113. Id.
114. 1948-1949 Trade Cas. (CCH), 62,248.
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to process of service." 5 Ruling under section 12 of the Clayton Act, the
court found that the activities did constitute "transacting of business," but
that they did not reach the level of "doing of business" necessary for the
court to sustain jurisdiction. " 6
B. The Second Response to Diamond Monopolization"7
DEBEERS II
The second United States Government case against the De Beers group
consisted of both criminal and civil actions, and was filed against a De Beers
subsidiary and two United States companies.' The government alleged
that the companies conspired to fix prices and allocate customers and
territories for the sale of diamond abrasive in violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act."' Unlike DEBEERS I, the case did not deal with gem-
quality diamonds that the typical American consumer purchases.
Instead, it dealt with diamond "abrasive," or diamond "grit," a commodity
that is considered vital to American industries.''
As in DEBEERS I, obtaining jurisdiction against De Beers proved to be
a problem because De Beers conducted all of its American business outside
of the United States (using upwards of 300 different companies and corporate
pseudonyms, and a series of unrelated distributors). 2 De Beers opened
the door to American jurisdiction, however, when it sent grit to the United
States on consignment for sale. 1 In the indictment, however, the DOJ
became tangled in the complex De Beers organizational web and named De
Beers Industrial Diamond Division, Ltd. of Johannesburg, South Africa as
115. Id.
116. Id. See also FUGATE, supra note 39, § 3.6 at 226; EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 93, 200
117. United States v. De Beers Industrial Diamond Division, Ltd., Anco Diamond Abrasives
Corp., and Diamond Abrasives Corp., [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH),
45,074, Crim. No. 74 C 1151, Civ. No. 74 Civ. 5389 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 10, 1974).
118. Id.
119. Id. See also 1976-1 Trade Cas. (CCH), 60,825.
120. Id.
121. SCHUMACH, supra note 43, at 81 ("Diamond grit has experienced great adaptability and
rapid growth in industry because of its unique mechanical properties, including its superb
resistance to high temperatures, abrasion, and acids, its extremely high thermal conductivity, and
the fact that diamond is the hardest of all known substances. Because of these unique properties,
diamond grit is considered indispensable to the communications, electrical, constructions,
electronics, mining, metalworking, automotive, aircraft, and other industries which have
ultrahard materials, close tolerances, fine finishes, interchangeability, speed, and precision. In
1972, there were approximately 16.1 million carats of diamond grit consumed in the United
States. There are no facilities in the United States for the commercial mining of natural diamond
grit." (quoting the indictment)).
122. EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 202. KANFER, supra note 43, at 317. See also Part
H(A)(1), supra, regarding the De Beers corporate structure.
123. KOSKOFF, supra note 43, at 324. See also EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 201-210.
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a defendant. 24 De Beers undoubtedly established that De Beers Industrial
Division of Johannesburg was the wrong subsidiary and therefore not a
proper party."Z The Justice Department was eventually forced to substitute
De Beers Industrial Diamond Division (Ireland), Ltd. (the subsidiary of the
group responsible for marketing the grit) in place of the South African
subsidiary in order to establish the link necessary for jurisdiction.'26
Due to the wealth of evidence against it, in 1976 the subsidiary entered
a plea of nolo contendere on the criminal charges; it was fined $40,000 and
entered into a rather insignificant consent decree in the civil case.' 27 While
it is noteworthy that the De Beers parent was absent from the indictment,
clearly because of the jurisdictional issue, the DOJ explained that any De
Beers firm engaged in the sale of diamond grit would be bound the injunctive
provisions. 128
The commentators were not pleased with the result: "In agreeing to the
settlement, the government implicitly acknowledged that De Beers Consoli-
dated does not do business within the United States; that it [is] beyond the
reach of the [U.S.] antitrust laws."' 29 That may have been true in 1975.
As illustrated by the 1993 decision in Hartford Fire, however, United States
courts now view the international application of the antitrust laws differently.
Current antitrust law may now be able to reach the De Beers cartel despite
its use of avoidance tactics.
124. [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH), 45,074.
125. See EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 210.
126. [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH), 45,074. See also KOSKOFF,
supra note 43, at 325.
127. [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH), 1 45,074 (criminal plea made
July 15, 1976; civil consent decree filed July 1, 1976 and entered Dec. 8, 1976). See
SCHUMACH, supra note 43, at 82; EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 210. See also 1978-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH), 62,056; United States v. De Beers Industrial Diamond Div. (Ireland), Ltd., et. al.,
1976 WL 1399 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 1976) (consent decree); 1976-1 Trade Cas. (CCH), 1 60,825.
The nolo contendere plea is significant because the defendant does not admit or deny the
charges. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1048 (6th ed. 1990). See ANDERSEN & ROGERS, supra
note 8, § 2.02, at 52 ("Most government antitrust cases (eighty percent or more) never are tried
but rather are settled, generally by a device known as a consent decree. Consent decrees, which
are used by the Antitrust Division [of the DOJ] as well as by the FTC, are in effect court
approved negotiated settlements in which the defendant agrees to restrain its behavior in some
way in return for the government's cessation of the case.")
128. [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH), 1 45,074.
129. KOSKOFF, supra note 43, at 325.
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C. The Third Response to Diamond Monopolization3'
DEBEERS III
DEBEERS III arose from a civil suit brought against General Electric by
a former employee, in which it was alleged that the company had entered
into price fixing agreements with De Beers to control the international price
of industrial diamonds.' 3 ' Alerted by the allegations in that suit, the DOJ
started an antitrust investigation into the matter. 32 On February 17, 1994,
a federal grand jury in the Southern District of Ohio indicted De Beers
Centenary AG, General Electric, and two individuals.'33 The one-count
indictment alleged that De Beers and General Electric conspired to raise list
prices of industrial diamonds worldwide.'34 Because De Beers and General
Electric allegedly conspired as competing distributors of the diamonds, the
theory of the case will revolve around a horizontal restraint of trade.
The case will be significant in how it resolves two important questions.
First, acquiring jurisdiction over De Beers was a difficult problem in both
DEBEERS I and DEBEERS II. How will jurisdiction be sustained in this
case? De Beers already appears to be contesting jurisdiction, as expressed
by a De Beers spokesman in Johannesburg, South Africa, when asked
whether De Beers would stand trial in Ohio."' The response of the
spokesman was simply that "We don't do business in the U.S."' 36  This
would infer that De Beers either does not "effect" the United States diamond
market (necessary to establish subject matter jurisdiction), or does not have
130. United States v. General Electric Co., De Beers Centenary AG, Peter Frenz, and
Philippe Liotier, 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 45,094 (crim. No. CR-2-94-019, S.D.Ohio Feb.
17, 1994)).
131. Antitrust Division is Probing Price Fixing in Diamond Industry, Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA), No. 1563 (Apr. 30, 1992) (listing Russell v. General Electric Co., No. C-1-92-343
(S.D. Ohio Apr. 21, 1992)). The civil suit apparently prompted a defendant in an unrelated
civil case brought by General Electric to seek to amend their complaint to allege the worldwide
conspiracy. See Defendants Can't Amend Counterclaims, Antitrust & Reg. Rep. (BNA), No.
1602 (Feb. 18, 1993) (identifying General Electric Co. v. Sung, No. 89-40094-GN (D. Mass.,
Jan. 6, 1993)). The court denied the motion because it would have "unduly prejudice[d]"
General Electric. Id.
132. Antitrust Division is Probing Price Fixing in Diamond Industry, Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA), No. 1563 (Apr. 30, 1992)
133. 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 45,094.
134. Id. See also Industrial Diamond Manufacturers Indicted for Conspiring to Fix Prices,
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH), No. 303 (Feb. 22, 1994); General Electric, De Beers Face Charges
of Fixing Prices of Industrial Diamond, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), No. 1652 (Feb.
24, 1994); William M. Carley, Price-Fixing Charges Put GE and DeBeers Under Tough
Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 1994, at Al; John Mintz, GE, De Beers Indicted On Price-
Fixing Charges Firms Accused of Bid to Hike Diamond Prices, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1994, at
D1.
135. William M. Carley, Price-Fixing Charges Put GE and DeBeers Under Tough Scrutiny,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 1994, at Al.
136. Id. De Beers also failed to appear for the arraignment in March. See Richard B.
Schmitt, U.S. Antitrust Effort May Use Private-Detective Firm, WALL ST. J., May 6, 1994, at
B5.
[Vol. 24
22
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 24, No. 2 [1994], Art. 6
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol24/iss2/6
1994] U.S. ANTITRUST STATUTES AND INT'L DIAMOND TRADE 299
sufficient "minimum contacts" with the United States (necessary to sustain
personal jurisdiction). Those issues are discussed in more detail in Part
III(D), infra.
Second, this is another case against a De Beers parent-De Beers
Centenary AG of Switzerland-and not a mere subsidiary as in DEBEERS
II. Will the parent successfully claim that it was not directly responsible for
the alleged conduct? In the past De Beers utilized some 300 different
companies and corporate pseudonyms to avoid "contact" with the United
States, thereby shielding itself from United States jurisdiction.137 As noted
in DEBEERS II, De Beers was able to use that intricate maze of companies
to force the substitution of another subsidiary for the original South African
defendant. 3 ' De Beers will no doubt again rely on such complex corporate
structures to insulate itself from jurisdiction.
Despite these problems, the DOJ nevertheless appears ready to pursue
the case, having already obtained the indictment. 39  Perhaps the time has
come where the facade of "uninvolved" corporate structures and subsidiaries
will not protect the parent from allegations of antitrust violations. The
observer should be advised, however, that DEBEERS III deals strictly with
industrial grade diamonds. As such, any legal order that may result from the
case should have no effect on the retail diamond market or the prices the
average consumer will pay for a gem quality diamond.
However, the resolution of these issues will have an impact on the
prosecution of a subsequent case against De Beers dealing with restraints of
gem quality diamonds. Despite the industrial diamond limitation, the
importance of the case has not gone unnoticed to business commentators,
who noted that the case would be "one of the most far-ranging and hard-
fought cases in antitrust annals.""4 Perhaps it will provide the DOJ with
the experience and incentive to revisit DEBEERS I and pursue the larger area
137. EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 202. KANFER, supra note 43, at 317.
138. [1970-1979 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH), 45,074. See also KOSKOFF,
supra note 43, at 325; EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 210. The DOJ is acutely aware of this
problem. It has been reported that they are considering hiring a private-detective firm to gather
information on De Beers' corporate arrangements. See Richard B. Schmitt, U.S. Antitrust Effort
May Use Private-Detective Firm, WALL ST. J., May 6, 1994, at B5 ("Others say the government
may be looking for help in proving that certain individuals or companies under investigation
were in fact affiliated with De Beers.")
139. The DOJ previously stated its opinion with respect to cases such as De Beers:
"Conduct relating to U.S. import trade that harms consumers in the United States may be subject
to the jurisdiction of the U.S. antitrust laws regardless of where such conduct occurs or the
nationality of the parties involved. Thus, for example, applying the Sherman Act to restrain or
punish a private international cartel the purpose and effect of which is to restrict output and raise
prices to U.S. consumers may be both appropriate and necessary to effective enforcement of that
Act." DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL
OPERATIONS 29 (1988). Also, the DOJ is considering employing the services of a prominent
private-detective firm to bolster its case against De Beers. See Richard B. Schmitt, U.S.
Antitrust Effort May Use Private-Detective Firm, WALL ST. J., May 6, 1994, at B5.
140. William M. Carley, Price-Fixing Charges Put GE and DeBeers Under Tough Scrutiny,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 1994, at Al.
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of monopolization in which De Beers engages, the natural gem-quality
diamond market. This Comment will now turn to that problem.
D. Applying Current United States Antitrust Law
There are four steps that must be satisfied to prosecute De Beers under
current antitrust law: (1) subject matter jurisdiction must be established; (2)
in personam jurisdiction must be satisfied; (3) international comity consider-
ations must be addressed; and (4) a violation of the antitrust statutes must be
proven. (While jurisdiction and comity are typically threshold questions that
would be addressed by a court before considering an alleged violation, they
are, in fact, the more difficult legal issues and will be addressed last in this
Comment).
In addition, because De Beers is a corporate group, the question of who
the proper defendant is must also be addressed. This discussion will follow
the analysis of the four steps necessary to establish a successful antitrust case.
1. Establishing a Violation
Two broad theories by which an antitrust claim can be successfully
prosecuted are the "vertical restraint of trade theory" and the "horizontal
restraint of trade theory."' 4' This Comment will use those theories to
analyze possible violations of antitrust laws by De Beers. 4"
a. Vertical Restraint of Trade
Vertical restraints involve agreements between firms at different levels
of the distribution system to restrain competition, e.g. suppliers conspiring
with wholesalers or retailers. 143  Mr. Edward Epstein, author of The Rise
& Fall of Diamonds, outlines six "rules of the game" that diamond buyers
must follow in order to do business with De Beers; these rules provide an
excellent framework for an analysis of antitrust violations on the theory of
vertical restraint of trade:
141. See generally ANDERSEN & ROGERS, supra note 8, §§ 6.01-.06 at 643-805 (vertical
restraint of trade), and §§ 4.01-.02, at 247-345 (horizontal restraint of trade).
142. Other theories may be available to prosecute defendants for antitrust violations, e.g.
theories based on merger (both vertical and horizontal, as well as conglomerate) and price
discrimination (the Robinson-Patman Act). Additionally, the discussion that follows is a survey
of representative antitrust cases and issues, and is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of
all antitrust law and precedent that could be brought to bear against De Beers.
143. See generally ANDERSEN & ROGERS, supra note 8, §§ 6.01-.06 at 643-805, for a
discussion of vertical restraint of trade.
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1. No one may question the authority of the Diamond Trading
Company to decide who gets which diamonds;
2. There shall be no haggling over the price of diamonds, because De
Beers fixes the price that buyers must pay;
3. Take the entire box of diamonds that is offered to you, or take
none at all and risk being rejected as a future buyer;
4. No client may resell uncut diamonds without a special dispensation
from De Beers, which must control the world stockpile of uncut
diamonds in order to maintain prices;
5. Clients will supply De Beers with information to assess the
diamond market by filling out a questionnaire detailing inventory
and sales [price] aspects of their business; and
6. Diamonds must never be sold to resellers who undercut the
market, because the illusion must be maintained that diamonds
never decrease in value; thus, De Beers does not allow "price
wars. "144
Establishing a violation can be the most difficult part of the case because
of evidentiary considerations-obtaining acceptable proof. Assuming that
these rules could be verified by the DOJ, 45 these rules could form the
basis of a successful antitrust action based on the theory of vertical restraint
of trade, i.e. restraints imposed by the supplier (De Beers) on the resellers
both by mandating pricing maintenance and by implementing distribution
restrictions. ,46
The existence of both a distribution restriction and a price maintenance
agreement is evidenced by De Beers' rule 6, supra. Rule 6 essentially
requires a reseller to sell only to the ultimate consumer or to a reseller who
will charge a higher price. 47 The purpose of the rule, according to
Epstein, is to prevent price wars and to maintain the price of diamonds."14
If a reseller sold diamonds to another reseller at a reduced cost, the market
price of diamonds, as set by De Beers, would fall. 49 Similarly, the
existence of distribution restrictions is further evidenced by De Beers rule 4,
supra (which prevents resellers from selling uncut diamonds to other resellers
144. EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 60-65.
145. The impediments to verification and accumulation of evidence are discussed in Part IV,
infra.
146. Id. Another form of vertical restraint that De Beers arguably practices is excluding
competing firms from the market, e.g., refusing to allow sales to certain resellers in order to
maintain its monopoly. See De Beers Rules 3-6, supra. For the sake of brevity, this Comment
will focus on the more obvious behavior of resale price maintenance and distribution restrictions
suggested by Rules 4 and 6.
147. EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 60-65.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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as this would impede the ability of De Beers to mandate the price of uncut
diamonds). 50
De Beers maintains these pricing mandates and distribution restrictions
by imposing severe penalties: a violator will either be forced to buy
worthless diamonds at an inflated cost for several years or will be forever
rejected as an eligible buyer."' In essence, the goal is to punish resellers
who jeopardize the continued existence of the monopoly.
These facts establish classic antitrust violations. First, Rule 6, which
dictates that diamonds may not be sold to resellers who undercut the market,
is an illegal pricing arrangement in violation of the Sherman Act: As far
back as 1911, in Dr. Miles Medical Company v. John D. Park & Sons,
Company,'52 the U.S. Supreme Court held that: "[A]greements or combi-
nations between dealers, having for their sole purpose the destruction of
competition and the fixing of prices, are injurious to the public interest and
void."' 53 Likewise, minimum price agreements comparable to Rule 6 were
held to be in violation of the Sherman Act by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Paramount Pictures. 15 4
Second, Rules 4 and 6 are illegal distribution restrictions in violation of
the antitrust laws as they restrict to whom diamonds can be sold in order to
further the monopoly. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in United States
v. Arnold, Schwinn & Company:
Under the Sherman Act, it is unreasonable without more for a manufac-
turer to seek to restrict and confine areas or persons with whom an article
may be traded after the manufacturer has parted with dominion over
it .... If the manufacturer parts with dominion over his product or
transfers risk of loss to another, he may not reserve control over its destiny
or the conditions of its resale."'5
In each case, explicit agreements obligating resellers to such conduct are
not required; in Federal Trade Comm'n v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 56 the
Court recognized that violations of the Sherman Act occurred when an
implied agreement would "unduly hinder or obstruct the free and natural flow
of commerce in the channels of interstate trade."' 57  De Beers punishes
150. Id.
151. Id. at 64.
152. 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (price fixing by drug manufacturer held to be in violation of the
Sherman Act).
153. Id. at 408.
154. 334 U.S. 131, 143-44 (1948) (motion picture producers, distributors, and exhibitors
violated Sherman Act due to agreements to restrict trade).
155. 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967) (bicycle manufacturer violated Sherman Act by restricting
trade of bicycles after transferring ownership of them to distributors).
156. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922) (upheld FTC
cease and desist order prohibiting price fixing with respect to defendant's products).
157. Id. at 453 (interpreting United States v. Colgate Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) as not
requiring the existence of a formal agreement, but merely a tacit agreement).
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those who resell uncut diamonds by refusing to deal with them in order to
maintain their monopoly.' Those who knowingly continue to deal under
these terms are therefore participating in implied agreements not to resell,
and are committing antitrust violations even though formal explicit agree-
ments dictating such conduct may not exist.'59
A Note on "The Rules" and the Collection of Evidence
Rules similar to those discussed, supra, were the basis of a 1953 DOJ
antitrust case against two diamond trade associations in the United States."6
In United States v. Diamond Dealers Club, Inc., and Diamond Center,
Inc.,6 a suit was brought against the associations under section 1 of the
Sherman Act. 62
The result of the litigation was a consent decree that enjoined the
associations from (1) restricting, restraining or preventing the importation
diamonds into, and the exportation of diamonds out of, the United States; (2)
hindering, restricting, restraining or preventing any diamond dealer from
participating in free and unlimited trade in diamonds with any other dealer;
(3) forcing, urging or coercing any diamond dealer not to deal with another
dealer; and (4) imposing or attempting to impose any assessment, fines,
expulsion or other penalty upon members for dealing with any another
dealer.'63 It also required the associations to "abolish any instrumentality
of control, surveillance or information designed to implement and restriction
or restraint on diamond imports or exports."'"
The associations were ordered to serve a copy of the decree on each of
its members, and to expel any present or future member who violated the
prohibitions. 65 In addition, the associations gave the DOJ authority to
interview officers and employees of the associations, and to access all books,
ledgers, accounts, correspondence, memorandums and other records and
documents in the possession or under the control of the associations." If
158. EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 60-65. Because most producers contract with De Beers'
CSO, if the wholesalers cannot buy from De Beers, their ability to remain in the diamond
industry is severally hampered. See Francesca Chapman, Industry Virtual Monopoly De Beers
Holds 80 % of World Supply, PHILADELPHIA DAILY NEWS, Feb. 7, 1994, at 24.
159. See also Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226-27 (1939) ("it was
enough that, knowing that concerted action was contemplated and invited, the distributors gave
their adherence to the scheme and participated in it." The defendants were found liable for
Sherman Act violations); United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 723
(1944) (an arrangement whereby dealers would be bound to sell at locally prevailing prices and
only to the public violated the Sherman Act).
160. 1955 Trade Cas. (CCH), 67,987.
161. 1955 Trade Cas. (CCH), 67,987, No. Civ. 76-343 (S.D.N.Y. filed June 23, 1953).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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Epstein is correct and "The Rules" continue to exist, diamond dealers must
fear the De Beers cartel more than the DOJ. The consent decree, at least,
gives the DOJ an easier way to collect evidence for a future suit.
b. Horizontal Restraint of Trade
Horizontal restraints involve agreements between competitors at the same
distribution level to restrain competition, e.g. when several sellers at the
same level enter into an agreement to fix prices. 67 DEBEERS III is based
on the horizontal theory of antitrust, because De Beers and General Electric
are competitors at the same distribution level. 6 ' Similarly, De Beers' con-
tracts with other major producers for the supply of their diamonds would, if
at all, be covered under the horizontal theory of antitrust because each of the
producers is (or at least has the capacity to be "but for" the agreement) a
direct competitor of De Beers. 69
Not all cooperation among producers is considered an antitrust violation,
however, as noted by Justice Brandeis in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United
States:
[T]he legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so
simple a test, as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement
concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain,
is of their very essence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint
imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competi-
tion or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.' 70
The DOJ accepts the premise of this logic: "Nearly all productive activity
involves cooperation that limits the independent commercial decision making
of the parties and that therefore literally could be said to restrain trade."' 7 '
To differentiate the proper from the improper, the U.S. Supreme Court
compels the use of two tests, the "rule of reason" and per se condemnation
167. See generally ANDERSEN & ROGERS, supra note 8, §§ 4.01-.02, at 247-345, for a
discussion of horizontal restraint of trade.
168. See William M. Carley, Price-Fixing Charges Put GE and DeBeers Under Tough
Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 1994, at Al.
169. See De Beers In Control, PI'rrSBURGH POsT-GAZETrE, Feb. 7, 1994, at A3 ("the cartel
signs contracts with producers that guarantee steady sales and prices, but occasionally imposes
quotas."); Canadian Diamond Mines May Lead To A Challenge of the De Beers System, CHIC.
TRIB., Feb. 14, 1994, at 8 ("Secretive De Beers has managed to regulate world diamond prices
for 60 years through deals that require producers to sell via its CSO. The CSO seeks to prevent
a diamond glut from hitting the market, buying and holding stones when prices are weak and
then selling when prices rise.") These allegations are confirmed by De Beers itself. See DE
BEERS REPORT, supra note 54, at 12.
170. 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (Brandeis, J.).
171. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 6 (1988).
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tests."7 The DOJ continues to use these two analysis methods, differentiat-
ing their applicability by the conduct involved:
The Department condemns as per se unlawful "naked" restraints of trade
that are so inherently anticompetitive and so rarely beneficial that extensive
analysis of their precise competitive effects in unnecessary. . . . On the
other hand, the Department applies a rule-of-reason analysis to agreements
that involve some form of economic integration that goes beyond the mere
coordination of the parties' decisions on price or output and that in general
may generate procompetitive efficiencies."
The "rule of reason" provides some flexibility for the producers to
establish that procompetitive efficiencies may be obtain from coordination,
and is therefore would be a harder test for the DOJ to meet. In Standard Oil
of N.J. v. United States, the landmark "rule of reason" case, the Court
outlined the three areas that are determinative of the reasonableness of a
defendant's monopolizing activities: (1) the purpose of the arrangement; (2)
the character (power) of the parties; and (3) the necessary effect of their
actions. 74 Whether the conditions which differentiate proper from improp-
er conduct under the "rule of reason" can be successfully applied to De
Beers' conduct with the other diamond producers is questionable. The result
is certainly one in which reasonable people could differ. On the one hand,
it can be argued that the only reason De Beers has contracts with the
producers is to artificially control the supply of diamonds, and not to assist
the market. On the other hand, it can be argued that De Beers must engage
in cooperative agreements with producers or the producers would not be able
to afford to mine diamonds.
The need for a simpler test in terms of debating the conduct of De Beers
is certainly called for. The per se approach, held to be non-exclusive with
the rule of reason in United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., provides the
needed test.' 75 As stated by Justice Stone in Trenton Potteries, the act of
price-fixing versus mere cooperation can never be tested by a reasonableness
standard:
The aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, if effective, is in the
elimination of one form of competition. The power to fix prices, whether
reasonably exercised or not, involves power to control the market and to
fix arbitrary and unreasonable prices. The reasonable price fixed today
may through economic and business changes become the unreasonable
price of tomorrow. Once established, it may be maintained unchanged
172. See Standard Oil of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (adopting the "rule of
reason"); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (holding that per se
condemnation and "rule of reason" are not mutually exclusive).
173. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL
OPERATIONS 6 (1988).
174. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 65-67.
175. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. at 400.
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because of the absence of competition secured by the agreement for a price
reasonable when fixed. Agreements which create such potential power
may well be held to be in themselves unreasonable or unlawful restraints,
without the necessity of minute inquiry whether a particular price is
reasonable or unreasonable as fixed and without placing on the government
in enforcing the Sherman Law the burden of ascertaining from day to day
whether it has become unreasonable through the mere variation in
economic conditions. 176
The Court affirmed the rigid per se approach condemning all price-fixing
arrangements in United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co. (Madison Oil), a
case with facts strikingly similar to the De Beers situation.'77 In Madison
Oil, the oil refining industry was depressed much the way the diamond
industry would be if market forces were allowed to control; that is, demand
was decreased and the supply was increasing. 178 To alleviate the situation,
a group of major refining companies informally agreed to buy all surplus
gasoline from independent producers in order to dispose of it in an organized
manner so as to not depress prices. 179 The Court held that the arrangement
managed to keep prices above the level that competitive conditions in the
industry would otherwise have brought about.' 80 The Court rejected the
argument that the arrangement served to stabilize the market, stating that the
approach had "no legal justification" and that the reasonableness of the prices
was no defense.' The result was clear:
[M]arket manipulation in its various manifestations is implicitly an artificial
stimulus applied to (or at times a break on) market prices, a force which
distorts those prices, a factor which prevents the determination of those
prices by free competition alone .... Under the Sherman Act a combina-
tion formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing,
fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or
foreign commerce is illegal per se. I
While the "rule of reason" approach may be favored when questionable
cases of cooperation are in issue, in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Soc'y the Court affirmed that the per se approach remains the approach when
price-fixing is the issue.' 83 Indeed, in Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc.
176. Id. at 397-98 (Stone, J.).
177. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
178. Id. at 170-71.
179. Id. at 179, 191.
180. Id. at 219-20.
181. Id. at 220-21.
182. Id. at 223.
183. 457 U.S. 332, 347 (1982) ("We have not wavered in our enforcement of the per se rule
against price fixing.").
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the Court has even held that the effect of the agreement on price need only
be indirect to be per se illegal."
In order to prove a violation for price-fixing under the per se approach,
"proof that there was a conspiracy [an agreement], that its purpose was to
raise prices, and that it caused or contributed to a price raise is proof of the
actual consummation or execution of a conspiracy under section 1 of the
Sherman Act..'"" The problem of proving an agreement is acute in
DEBEERS III; De Beers and General Electric deny that an agreement to fix
prices existed and the DOJ will be put to its proof at least with respect to
General Electric. 186
In the long run, however, De Beers itself may not be saved-it
acknowledges that it engages in contracts (agreements) to obtain the major
producer's output of diamonds."7
That these contracts amount to price fixing is evident from De Beers' own
admissions:
THE policy of De Beers, as leader of the diamond industry, is to maintain
the long-term stability and prosperity of the industry as a whole. To that
end, De Beers and its associates in the diamond business established and
built up the CSO, which markets around 80 per cent of the world's
diamond production, meeting so far as possible the needs of the individual
cutting centres [sic] for the rough diamonds that are produced. Although
the trend of retail demand continues upwards, setbacks in the world market
do occur from time to time, usually affecting sales of particular sizes or
qualities of diamonds, and stocks in the cutting centres [sic] also fluctuate.
The CSO's policy during these periods is to maintain price stability by
adjusting supplies to its clients in the cutting centres [sic] to demand, while
maintaining its purchases from producers at a reasonable level in terms of
quota arrangements. Undue curtailment of production is thereby avoided
and the CSO, drawing on its large financial resources, is able to hold the
temporary excess of production in stock until demand improves. Stability
has always been recognised [sic] as essential to the diamond industry, in
the first place because the price fluctuations that are accepted as normal in
the case 0/most raw materials would destroy public confidence in the value
o fem diamonds, which in terms of consumer spending are a luxury
It is striking how similar the De Beers policy is to the policy of the oil
companies condemned by the Court in Madison Oil. The oil companies were
held in violation because the buying programs affected market prices: "So
184. 446 U.S. 643, 647-48 (1980) (per curiam). This is not true with respect to vertical
agreements. See, e.g., Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717,
734-35 (1988) ("This notion of equivalence between the scope of horizontal per se illegality and
that of vertical per se illegality was explicitly rejected . . .").
185. Madison Oil, 310 U.S. at 219-20. See also Catalano, 446 U.S. at 647.
186. See William M. Carley, Price-Fixing Charges Put GE and DeBeers Under Tough
Scrutiny, WALL ST. J.., Feb. 22, 1994, at Al.
187. See DE BEERS REPORT, supra note 54, at 1, 12.
188. Id. (emphasis added). Since the statements were contained in its annual report, they
may be considered admissions of a party-opponent under FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A).
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far as cause and effect are concerned it is sufficient in this type of case if the
buying programs of the combination resulted in a price rise and market
stability which but for them would not have happened."'' 9 It was irrele-
vant that some unaffected suppliers of oil remained: "For it is indisputable
that competition was restricted through the removal by respondents of a part
of the supply which but for the buying programs would have been a factor
in determining the going prices on those markets.""9 Indeed, the method
of price-fixing used by the oil companies, that of purchasing the surplus, to
keep the market from becoming depressed was illegal:
Where the machinery for price-fixing is an agreement on the prices to be
charged or paid for the commodity in the interstate or foreign channels of
trade the power to fix prices exists if the combination has control of a
substantial part of the commerce in that commodity. Where the means for
price-fixing are purchases or sales of the commodity in a market operation
or, as here, purchases of a part of the supply of the commodity for the
purpose of keeping it from having a depressive effect on the markets, such
power may be found to exist...
It would appear that De Beers, by its own admission, has conceded that it
engages in horizontal antitrust violations.
While De Beers attempts to justify its practices under the rubric of
protection of producers, dealers, cutters, jewelers, and customers,'9 there
is not much De Beers could do to legally justify its actions. As noted in
Madison Oil, neither the adverse effect of the agreement nor the power to
control the market need be established. 93  Similarly, as expressed in
Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, it is no defense that the agreements have
"procompetitive justifications,"" or even that the judiciary does not have
experience with the antitrust implications and necessities of the particular
industry.' 95
189. Madison Oil, 310 U.S. at 219.
190. Id. at 220.
191. Id. at 223-24.
192. DE BEERS REPORT, supra note 54, at 12 (1993) (H.F. Oppenheimer, the former
Chairman of De Beers, discussed "protection" as a justification for these practices).
193. Madison Oil, 310 U.S. at 218 ("Thus for over forty years this Court has consistently
and without deviation adhered to the principle that price-fixing agreements are unlawful per se
under the Sherman Act and that no showing of so-called competitive abuses or evils which those
agreements were designed to eliminate or alleviate may be interposed as a defense."); id. at 225
n.59 (discussing power to control the market).
194. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 332 U.S. at 351 ("The respondents' principal
argument is that the per se rule is inapplicable because their agreements are alleged to have
procompetitive justifications. The argument indicates a misunderstanding of the per se concept.
The anticompetitive potential inherent in all price-fixing agreements justifies their facial
invalidation even if procompetitive justifications are offered for some.").
195. Id. at 349 ("We are equally unpersuaded by the argument that we should not apply the
per se rule in this case because the judiciary has little antitrust experience in the health care
industry."); Id. at 351 ("the argument that the per se rule must be rejustified for every industry
that has not been subject to significant antitrust litigation ignores the rationale for per se rules,
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2. Establishing Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Obtaining subject matter jurisdiction over foreign companies was a
difficult hurdle through the time of DEBEERS 1.196 However, since the
1945 decision in ALCOA, the courts have viewed the extraterritorial
application of United States antitrust laws differently and are more receptive
to recognizing subject matter jurisdiction over foreign companies that violate
the Sherman Act."9
Three steps now recognized as the threshold for granting subject matter
jurisdiction to a United States court over a foreign defendant in an antitrust
action. First, there must be a statutory grant of authority for a federal court
to exercise jurisdiction. 98 For civil actions, the federal question aspect of
the Sherman Act meets the legislative requirement of 28 U.S.C. section
1331.'99 Second, there must be proof of a restraint affecting or intended
to affect American foreign commerce. Finally, the plaintiff must show that
the effect is substantially large enough to present a cognizable injury.2
In 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed these principles in Harford
Fire Insurance Company v. California.2 °" In that case, the complaint
alleged that London reinsurers violated the Sherman Act by conspiring to
coerce primary insurers in the United States to restrict certain types of
insurance coverage, thereby depriving residents of California of coverage
under these types of insurance.'z2 The Court held that the district court
had jurisdiction over Sherman Act claims because it was alleged that "the
London reinsurers engaged in unlawful conspiracies to affect the market for
insurance in the United States and that their conduct in fact produced
substantial effect. ' 20 3
which in part is to avoid 'the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic
investigation into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries, in an
effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable-an inquiry so
often wholly fruitless when undertaken.'" (quoting Northern Pacific R. Co. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958))).
196. See Part I(B), supra. Note, however, that DEBEERS I was decided on considerations
of personal jurisdiction. See 1948-1949 Trade Cas. (CCH), 62,248.
197. See Part I(B), supra.
198. See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
199. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1993) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." The court
would therefore have original jurisdiction for a Sherman Act claim, as it is a federal law).
200. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613 (summarizing antitrust case law to date in upholding
Sherman Act jurisdiction for acts that maintained control of the Honduran lumber export
business). A third required test, international comity considerations, is addressed in Part
III(C)(4), infra.
201. Hartford Fire, 113 S. Ct. at 2910.
202. Id. at 2908 (London reinsurer conspired to limit coverage of certain types of
commercial general liability, pollution liability, and property contamination liability insurance).
203. Id. at 2909. See also Matsushita Elec., 475 U.S. at 582 n.6 ("The Sherman Act does
reach conduct outside our borders, but only when the conduct has an effect on American
commerce."); Continental Ore, 370 U.S. at 704.
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Facts similar to that of the London reinsurers also exist with respect to
De Beers: Rules 4 and 6 indicate that De Beers engages in unlawful
conspiracies to affect the market for diamonds in the United States.2 De
Beers' conduct also produces the requisite substantial effect on American
commerce: It creates demand for a commodity that has no demand' and
little extrinsic value,2 and it receives some $2 billion a year for the
commodity from the American people.2' Also, by controlling 80% of the
world's output of the commodity, °" by definition it controls the market in
which most of the commodity is sold-the American market.'
Because De Beers restrains the trade of diamonds with the intent to affect
American diamond commerce, and because those restraints inflict an
enormous economic injury on the American public, subject matter jurisdic-
tion undoubtedly exists. The fact that De Beers engages in "straw man"
tactics such as exchanging the title to the diamonds in London is irrele-
vant; 2'0 De Beers knowingly does business with United States resellers
under an agreement that requires the resellers to restrict trade, 21' and by
which it has a substantial effect on American commerce.2
De Beers will undoubtedly argue the same exclusion that it is now
claiming in DEBEERS III: "We don't do business in the U.S."- perhaps
hoping to support a finding that it therefore cannot affect the United States
market.2 3 It is difficult to imagine such a response when its own annual
report boasts such statements as:
* "Retail sales of diamond jewellery [sic] in 1992 were
strongest in the US."
* "[S]ales of diamond jewelry in the US as well as other
consuming countries held up well against other luxury
products.'
204. See Part Im(C)(2), supra for a an antitrust analysis of the alleged De Beers Rules.
205. See EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 9-13. See also Patricia McLaughlin, Marketing is
Forever, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, June 9, 1985, at 35.
206. EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 237.
207. Id. at 138-39.
208. DE BEERS REPORT, supra note 54, at 12.
209. See EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 57; SCHUMACH, supra note 43, at 104.
210. See Part Im(D)(5), infra, for a discussion of applicable law as it relates to such tactics.
211. See EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 57; SCHUMACH, supra note 43, at 104.
212. See supra notes 204-09. See Nat'l Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 666 F.2d
6 (2d Cir. 1981) (no anti-competitive effects to U.S. commerce). See also DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 78 (1988),
in which the DOJ expressed its agreement. In a hypothetical case, 25% of the product was
consumed in the United States. The Guidelines conclude, "In view of the large percentage of
world X-ore production that is sold in the United States, it seems clear that the cartel would have
a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on U.S. import trade."
213. William M. Carley, Price-Fixing Charges Put GE and DeBeers Under Tough Scrutiny,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 1994, at Al.
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* "Towards the end of the year consumer demand for diamondjewelry in the US improved, with sales both at Thanksgiving
and Christmas some 10 per cent better than the year before."
* "CSO sales at the first three sights of the year have been
good . . .partly from increased polished exports to the
United States."
* "Another factor that may influence sales is the proposed
further releases from the US stockpile of diamonds. "21
The De Beers claim is nevertheless futile even if it does not "directly"
engage in the United States market: De Beers starts with ownership of the
diamonds; it engages in monopolistic conduct when passing title to the dia-
monds; the majority of the diamonds end up in the United States; and the
sale of those diamonds have a direct and substantial effect on American
commerce.
3. Establishing In Personam Jurisdiction
In order to establish in personam jurisdiction over a foreign defendant,
a two-step test must be satisfied. First, as stated by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Omni Capital International v. Wolff & Co., an appropriate long-arm
statute that authorizes service of process on the defendant is required. 15
Second, as stated by the Court in International Shoe v. Washington, due
process requires that "minimum contacts" with the forum be established such
that the "maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.' "216
a. Step One-Statutory Authority
No less than three statutes may provide authority to serve De Beers with
a civil suit. First, 15 U.S.C. section 21(f) provides the requisite authoriza-
tion to the FTC for antitrust claims, allowing "anyone duly authorized by the
214. DE BEERS REPORT, supra note 54, at 4, 13.
215. 484 U.S. 97, 111 (1987). Congress responded by adding a general statutory
authorization in FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f) and (k)(2) (1993). The Advisory Committee noted that
subdivision (f) "provides for service on individuals who are in a foreign country, replacing the
former subdivision (i) that was added to Rule 4 in 1963. Reflecting the pattern of Rule 4 in
incorporating state law limitations on the exercise of jurisdiction over persons, the former
subdivision (i) limited service outside the United States to cases in which extraterritorial service
was authorized by state or federal law. The new rule eliminates the requirement of explicit
authorization."
216. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). The
nature of the "forum"-whether it must be a single state, or whether it can be the entire
nation-is a perplexing problem that will be addressed, infra.
35
Montpelier: Diamonds are Forever? Implications of United States Antitrust Sta
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1994
312 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
commission" to serve complaints, orders, and other processes of the commis-
sion board.2 7
Second, section 12 of the Clayton Act also provides for service of
process in antitrust claims against corporations:
Any suit, action or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a corpora-
tion may be brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is an
inhabitant, but also in any district wherein it may be found or transacts
business; and all process in such cases may be served in the district ofV " 211
which it is an inhabitant, or wherever it may be found.
In DEBEERS I, the district court dismissed the suit after finding that De
Beers did "transact business" in the United States, but that it did not reach
the level of "doing business" necessary for the court to sustain jurisdic-
tion.219  The interpretation of section 12 of the Clayton Act has since
changed. In the leading case on the subject decided around the time of
DEBEERS I, United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, the U.S. Supreme
Court altered the interpretation of section 12. According to one com-
mentator:
The Court also showed a disposition, at least as to antitrust cartel cases, to
dispense with the fine distinctions of earlier cases and to practically
eliminate, in foreign trade cases, the distinction between "doing business
and "transacting business." ...The result in that case [DEBEERS I]
might well be different today in light of Scophony.221
Under section 12 of the Clayton Act, the question becomes whether the
De Beers group still "transacts business" in the United States as it did in
DEBEERS I. This question will be addressed, infra, with the discussion on
minimum contacts.
Finally, the newly-enacted Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) may
eliminate the need to use either of the previous statutes:
If the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the Constitution and laws
of the United States [i.e., minimum contacts], serving a summons or filing
a waiver of service is also effective, with respect to claims arising under
federal law, to establish personal jurisdiction over the person of any
defendant who is not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of generaljurisdiction of any state.2"
217. 15 U.S.C. § 21(f) (Supp. 1993) (authority is vested in the FTC, the International Trade
Commission, and other administrative agencies.).
218. 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1993).
219. 1948-1949 Trade Cas. (CCH), 62,248. See also FUGATE, supra note 39, § 3.6 at
226; EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 93, 200.
220. 333 U.S. 795 (1948).
221. FUGATE, supra note 39, § 3.8, at 235-36.
222. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2) (Supp. 1994).
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The effect of Rule 4(k)(2) will also be addressed, infra, with the discussion
on minimum contacts.
When dealing with criminal matters, the problems become more
complicated. For instance, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require
that the defendant must be served with a summons.' The government is
limited, however, on where it can serve the summons-it can only be served
"at any place within the jurisdiction of the United States."I This suggests
that the summons may only be served within the territorial limits of the
United States.' There is also the problem of the required presence of the
defendant during the trial.2' The issues in the criminal context are
complex as illustrated by the problem the DOJ had with DEBEERS III-it
had to wait until a De Beers executive visited the United States, which one
eventually did for a golf tournament.' If the De Beers representative had
not visited the United States, short of a perfected extradition agreement, the
U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Alvarez-Machain suggests that the
only other way to obtain the defendant in a criminal matter is to kidnap him
and bring him into United States territory! 28
b. Step Two-Minimum Contacts
Establishing the Proper Test
Using the International Shoe test, the requisite finding must be that the
defendant has engaged in at least "minimum contacts" with the state in
question. 29  On a cursory view, De Beers arguably has such minimum
contacts in that it sells diamonds to American resellers with the expectation
that those diamonds will be marketed in the American stream of commerce.
Like the defendants in International Shoe, it can be argued that the activities
223. Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 4, 18 U.S.C. (1986).
224. Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 4(d)(2), 18 U.S.C. (1986).
225. Under the "territorial principle," a sovereign nation has virtually complete power to
regulate what transpires within its own borders. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(1) (1987). See also FUGATE, supra note 39,
§ 3.4, at 214 ("Accordingly, it would not appear to be possible legally to serve a foreign
national with a subpoena in a criminal case outside of the United States.").
226. Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 43(a) and (c)(1), 18 U.S.C. (1976).
227. See William M. Carley, Price-Fixing Charges Put GE and DeBeers Under Tough
Scrutiny, WALL ST.J., Feb. 22, 1994 at AS.
228. 112 S. Ct. 2197 (1992) (Mexican citizen kidnapped in Mexico by United States-hired
operatives and brought to the United States to answer for a crime committed in Mexico in
violation of United States law. The extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico did
not directly prohibit the kidnapping, so the Court reasoned that the forcible abduction did not
"prohibit" the defendant's trial in a United States court "for violations of the criminal laws of
the United States." Such conduct may nevertheless be illegal under international law. See id.
at 2201-02 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
229. Id. at 319.
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of De Beers are neither "irregular nor casual," but "systematic and continu-
ous. "
23 0
When deciding International Shoe, however, the Court was deciding
whether the defendant had sufficient minimum contacts with the State of
Washington."' The test it formulated was with respect to a state in the
Union, not contacts with the United States as a whole. The question remains
whether the minimum contacts test can be applied on the basis of national
contacts. As one commentator has expressed the problem:
The distinction between national and state contacts can have considerable
practical importance. Many foreign defendants have fairly significant
contacts with the United States as a whole, but do not have substantial
contacts with any particular state of the Union. When this is the case, a
national contacts test may provide the only means for a U.S. court to
exercise jurisdiction over the foreign defendant. 2
The threshold question is whether the due process clause allows a
"national contacts" test. 23 In the Advisory Committee Notes to the new
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2), Congress stated that it believes
such a test exists:
There remain constitutional limitations on the exercise of territorialjurisdiction by federal courts over persons outside the United States....
The Fifth Amendment requires that any defendant have affiliating contacts
with the United States sufficient to justify the exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion over that party.TM
At least one Circuit has held that a "national contacts" test can be
utilized under the 5th Amendment due process clause in an extraterritorial
assertion of jurisdiction in an antitrust case:" The Ninth Circuit in Go-
Video, Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co. agreed with the district court that the
230. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320.
231. Id. (State of Washington satisfied constitutional Due Process requirements and properly
exercised jurisdiction over foreign corporation).
232. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 39, at 70.
233. Id.
234. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2) (Supp. 1994) (emphasis added).
235. For circuit decisions endorsing a national contacts test in a non-extraterritorial / non-
antitrust federal question setting, see Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1142-43 (2d Cir. 1974)
(action under Securities Exchange Act); United States v. Jim Walters Corp., 651 F.2d 251, 256(5th Cir. 1981) (action to enforce subpoena duces tecum under Federal Trade Commission Act);
Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1316 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom., Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 112 S.Ct. 1311 (1992)
(action under Securities Exchange Act); Lisak v. Mercantile Bancorp, Inc., 834 F.2d 668, 671-
72 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1007 (1988) (action under Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act); United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of Am. v. 163
Pleasant Street Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1085 (1st Cir. 1992) (action under Employee Retirement
Income Security Act); United Liberty Life Ins. Co. v. Ryan, 985 F.2d 1320, 1330 (6th Cir.
1993) (action under Securities Exchange Act); Busch v. Buchman, Buchman & O'Brien, 11 F.3d
1255, 1258 (5th Cir. 1994) (action under Securities Exchange Act).
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nationwide service provision of the Clayton Act justified a national contacts
test. 236 The court was faced with a constitutional challenge
to the national contacts analysis but found that, when a statute authorizes
nationwide service of process, such an analysis is appropriate." The court
reviewed the argument that the relevant contacts inquiry should focus on the
nation as a whole based on the fact that the sovereign in a federal question
case is the United States." They decided, however, to base their decision
on "the concrete language of a statute under which Congress has, as it is
unquestionably empowered to, authorized nationwide service of pro-
cess. ,,29
Using the rationale expressed in Go-Video, the Congressional proposition
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) Advisory Committee Notes
that the Fifth Amendment requires contacts "with the United States" should
be persuasive in establishing the national contacts test throughout the
country. 2
Analysis of the Minimum Contacts Test
In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, a non-antitrust case, the
U.S. Supreme Court discussed the minimum contacts test with respect to
aliens. 2" While the Court in a footnote stated that it did not have occasion
there to determine whether Congress could authorize federal court personal
jurisdiction over alien defendants based on the aggregate of national
contacts,242 the case is interesting because the defendant did not have
agents, offices, or property in the state in question; nor did it advertise,
solicit business, or control the distribution system in the state.243 The
Court noted that minimum contacts through the "stream of commerce" are
not enough; a "substantial connection" must exist between the nonresident
company and the state in question.2' According to a plurality of the Asahi
court, the substantial connection necessary for a finding of minimum contacts
must "come about by an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward
the forum State," 2' i.e., an "intent or purpose to serve the market in the
236. 885 F.2d 1406, 1414-16 (9th Cir. 1989).
237. Id. at 1415-1416.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2) (Supp. 1994).
241. 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (exercise of jurisdiction over Japanese manufacturer would be
unreasonable and unfair because they did not have intent to serve forum market).
242. Id. at 113 n.*. The Court again declined to answer the question in Omni Capital, 484
U.S. at 102 n.5.
243. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112.
244. Id. at 109.
245. Id. at 112.
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forum state. "' Conduct which may indicate such an intent or purpose
include advertising in the forum state; 7 and creating, controlling, or
employing the distribution system that brings the nonresident companies'
goods into the forum state.' s
Assuming a national contacts test does exist, De Beers arguably meets
the guidelines set forth in Asahi: (1) it established a distribution system
whereby it sells diamonds to American resellers (albeit in London) with the
express purpose that those diamonds be marketed in the United States; (2) it
controls the distribution system that brings its diamonds into the United
States by threatening resellers with the loss of De Beers diamonds ("The
Rules"); and (3) it engages in heavy advertising in the American market in
order to promote demand for its product in the United States. Furthermore,
De Beers (1) owns and maintains copyrights in the United States;249 (2)
trades its stock on a United States stock exchange;' 0 and (3) has definite
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. De Beers has registered three advertising copyrights with the U.S. Copyright Office:
PA168738 ("Reflections" registered 2-11-83), PA155904 ("The Hint" registered 10-26-81), and
PA151044 ("A Gem of an Evening" registered 6-30-82). Based on three rather novel questions
of law, the copyright registrations may be useful to establish that the requisite national contacts
exist: (1) Does the registration of intellectual property equate to maintaining property in the
United States for the purpose of judging national contacts? The question could be decided by
whether the "locus of existence" of the "property" remains with the owner (in this case in South
Africa), or attaches to the property as it would with a physical object (which, in this case,
manifests itself when displayed as advertising). (2) Does the fact that a copyright has been
registered contribute to its contacts? Like the defendant in International Shoe, De Beers
.receive[s] the benefits and protections of the [copyright] laws of the [United States], including
the right to resort to the courts for the enforcement of its rights." 326 U.S. at 320. (3) Does
the act of registering a copyright contribute to its contacts? At least one circuit court has been
approached with the last argument: In Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine
Distr. Pty. Ltd., 647 F.2d 200 (D.C. Cir. 1981), the plaintiff argued that the foreign defendant
"may have acted in the District in connection with their registration" of a trademark. Id. at 205
n. 11. Judge Ginsburg, writing for the court, dismissed the argument without addressing the
issue, basing her decision on a "governmental contacts" exception that was "grafted" to the
particular long-arm statute used to obtain jurisdiction in that case. Id.
250. De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd. is traded on NASDAQ; Standard and Poor's
reports its ticker symbol as DBRSY and its security number as 240253-30. STANDARD &
POOR'S CORPORATION, S&P DAILY STOCK PRICE RECORD NASDAQ 202 (July-Sept. 1993).
The two parents of the De Beers group, De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd. and De Beers
Centenary AG, trade as a linked unit. STANDARD AND POOR'S CORPORATION, STOCK RE-
PORTS-OVER THE COUNTER AND REGIONAL EXCHANGES (1993) (report number 3664). DE
BEERS REPORT, supra note 54, at 36, 68. De Beers does not invest their shares directly in the
United States, but issues American Depository Receipts (ADRs). See, e.g. ADRS, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 23, 1994, at C8 (symbol DBEER). As the district court explained in Consolidated
Gold Mines, "[a]n ADR allows the ownership and voting interest in a foreign corporation's
securities to be traded here, even though those securities are not registered here. See 17 C.F.R.
§§ 229, 230, 239.13 (1988). However, in order to remain exempt from registration in the
United States, the foreign corporation itself or the government that incorporated it must make
filings with the SEC pursuant to SEC Rule 12g3-2." 698 F. Supp. at 490. The Plaintiff argued
that the ADRs provided sufficient national contacts to sustain personal jurisdiction, but the court
refused to find jurisdiction on that basis because the plaintiff could not refute the defendants
claim that it did not facilitate the trading of the ADRs. Id. at 494. See also Williams v. Canon,
Inc., 432 F. Supp. 376, 379, 381 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (ADRs not relevant in establishing personal
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advertising agreements with United States diamond wholesalers.,,' The
combination of those factors arguably establish De Beers has an "intent or
purpose to serve the market" in the United States. 2
With respect to this myriad of national contacts, De Beers would
undoubtedly argue the same exclusion that it is now claiming in DEBEERS
III: "We don't do business in the U.S."-perhaps hoping to support a
finding that it therefore cannot have any contacts. 23 De Beers undoubtedly
believes that, by conducting all of its American business outside of the
United States, and by using different corporate pseudonyms and a series of
unrelated distributors, it will continue to shield itself from United States
antitrust liability. 4 De Beers must remember, however, that a finding of
"transacting business" is a requirement of only section 12 of the Clayton Act;
such a finding is not required in the application of Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 4(k)(2). 25  Thus, De Beers may be amenable to service based
on its "national contacts" alone, whether or not it engaged in "transacting
business." Also, as alluded to in Scophony, because De Beers has such a
substantial connection with the United States, the grounds for obtaining
personal jurisdiction over the syndicate may exist under the Clayton Act
"transacting business" test despite De Beers use of "straw man" tactics.
Whatever test is ultimately used, given the unusually wide- reaching
impact of De Beers' conduct on the American people, not hailing them into
a United States court would offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.
jurisdiction based on state contacts with California because they were incidental to the
defendant's business and were sold by its agent in New York). But cf Newport Components,
Inc. v. NEC Home Electronics, Inc., 671 F. Supp. 1525, 1540 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (the same
court found that it was proper to consider the trading of ADRs for purposes of establishing
personal jurisdiction under a national contacts test).
251. A recent advertisement appearing in The Smithsonian is signed by "De Beers" and
includes its slogan "A diamond is forever." SMITHSONIAN ASSOCIATES, THE SMITHSONIAN 55
(Nov. 1993). The advertisement states: "If you are considering an important diamond
gift ... simply call ... 1-800-241-9444." On calling the number, it connected to Lieber and
Solow, a wholesaler of diamonds in Manhattan. Giving De Beers the benefit of the doubt that
it does not have an ownership interest in Lieber and Solow, at a minimum it must have at least
an oral contract to either (1) provide free advertising and the potential customers generated by
that advertising, or (2) allow the use of its name to influence diamond buyers in the United
States. See also U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 30, 1994, at 48 (another similarly signed
De Beers Advertisement lists a second telephone number-800-553-5753). See Part III(D)(5),
infra, regarding the possible use of an agency theory to obtain jurisdiction.
252. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112.
253. William M. Carley, Price-Fixing Charges Put GE and DeBeers Under Tough Scrutiny,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 1994, at Al.
254. EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 202.
255. See 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1993); Scophony, 333 U.S. 795.
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4. International Comity Considerations
When a foreign company is involved, an additional issue must be
addressed-whether its connections to the United States are sufficiently strong
to justify an assertion of extraterritorial authority." This requires the
court to satisfy international comity considerations after finding jurisdic-
tion. 257
Comity refers "to the spirit of cooperation in which a domestic tribunal
approaches the resolution of cases touching the laws and interests of other
sovereign states."" 8 Justice Scalia described it as "the respect sovereign
nations afford each other by limiting the reach of their laws." 9 Comity
considerations have several facets.
a. Sovereign Immunity
The first consideration is sovereign immunity. This rule of customary
international law dictates that courts of one sovereign state generally do not
have jurisdiction to entertain suits against another state.2' The doctrine is
not applicable to this case since De Beers is a private corporation, rather than
a foreign government.26" ' Additionally, the sovereign immunity rule
generally does not apply to commercial acts by a foreign state.262
256. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613 (discussing the need to consider international comity when
deciding to exercise Sherman Act jurisdiction). The U.S. Supreme Court in Hartford Fire
specifically refused to address the question of "whether a court with Sherman Act jurisdiction
should ever decline to exercise such jurisdiction on grounds of international comity." Hartford
Fire, 113 S. Ct. at 2910. Indeed, other than the "conflict of laws" comity consideration, the
Court noted that "[w]e have no need in this case to address other considerations that might
inform a decision to refrain from the exercise of jurisdiction on grounds of international
comity." Id. at 2911 (emphasis added).
257. Hartford Fire, 113 S. Ct. at 2910 n.24 ("[C]oncems of comity come into play, if at
all, only after a court has determined that the acts complained of are subject to Sherman Act
jurisdiction. ").
258. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale (SNIA) v. United States District Court, 482
U.S. 522, 543 n.27 (1987) (Hague Evidence Convention applies to pending discovery demands).
259. Hartford Fire, 113 S. Ct. at 2920 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
260. International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (LAM) v. Org. of the
Petroleum Exporting Countries, 649 F.2d 1354, 1357 (9th Cir. 1981) (act of state doctrine bars
exercise of jurisdiction against OPEC for alleged price fixing of crude oil prices in violation of
Sherman Act). The rule has also been codified in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1330 (1976).
261. This would most likely be true even if the government of South Africa owned minority
shares in DeBeers. See William C. Hoffman, The Separate Entity Rule in International
Perspective: Should State Ownership of Corporate Shares Confer Sovereign Status for Immunity
Purposes?, 65 TUL. L. REv. 535 (1991).
262. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). See also Texas Trading
& Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300 (1981) (sovereign immunity
cannot be used as a defense by Nigeria to repudiate $1 billion in cement contracts and
unilaterally modify letters of credit issued to pay for cement); AM, 649 F.2d at 1357 (under the
restrictive theory, sovereign immunity does not apply to state commercial activities).
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b. Act of State
The second consideration-the act of state doctrine-is "a policy of
judicial abstention from inquiry into the validity of an act by a foreign
government."2 63 Similar to the "political question" doctrine in domestic
law,26" it was the basis by which another well-known monopolistic cartel,
OPEC, avoided antitrust liability in the United States.265 This doctrine
similarly is not applicable to De Beers because it is not a foreign govern-
ment.
c. Sovereign Compulsion
The third comity consideration-the defence of sovereign
compulsion-shields defendants from liability when they act in obedience to
a foreign government mandate.' This doctrine is likewise inapplicable
because South Africa (the home country of De Beers) discourages monopo-
lies,267 and Europe (the home of numerous De Beers subsidiaries) bans
monopolies through the European Economic Community.26
d. Conflict of Laws
A fourth and final comity consideration is conflict of laws, which allows
a court to dismiss an action if domestic law conflicts with foreign law and
policy.69 As noted in Hartford Fire, the mere lack of an antitrust statute
in those foreign jurisdictions will not suffice to show a foreign "policy";
263. See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1292 (3d Cir. 1979)
(issuance of patents by foreign power does not involve act of state or sovereign compulsion
doctrines); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (act of state doctrine
bars challenge to Cuban decree).
264. IAM, 649 F.2d 1354 at 1358-59. See also Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 605-06.
265. JAM, 649 F.2d at 1361-62.
266. Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1293.
267. See Stephen Levenberg & Maas Van Den Berg, Mergers and Acquisitions, INT'L FIN.
L. REV. 43 (Supp. May 1992) ("The Maintenance and Promotion of Competition Act, 1979 (the
Competition Act) provides for the maintenance and promotion of competition in South Africa
as well as for the prevention of restrictive practices").
268. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, The Treaty of Rome, Mar.
25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. (Article 85 prohibits "any agreements between enterprises, and
decisions by associations of enterprises and any concerted practices which are likely to affect
trade between the Member States and which have as their object or result the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition within the Common Market." Article 86 maintains that
"[t]o the extent to which trade between any Member State may be affected thereby, action by
one or more enterprises to take improper advantage of a dominant position within the Common
Market, or within a substantial part of it shall be deemed to be incompatible with the Common
Market and shall hereby be prohibited."). Nevertheless, the United Kingdom, at least, does not
seem interested in pursuing De Beers. See e.g. UK Agency Won't Probe Conduct of De Beers
in Diamond Market, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), No. 1431 (Aug. 31 1989) (according
to statement made by Sir Gordon Borrie, Director General of the Office of Fair Trading).
269. Hartford Fire, 113 S. Ct. at 2910. See also SNIA, 482 U.S. at 555.
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being consistent with the law is not to state that a conflict exists.27° In any
event, this doctrine is also not applicable to this case because South Africa
and the European Community have laws that discourage, rather than compel,
monopolistic conduct.27
A related conflict of laws comity consideration arises when a domestic
law conflicts with international law rather than the law of the home nation
of the foreign defendant. Writing in dissent in Hartford Fire, Justice Scalia
illustrated this consideration:
'[A]n act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of
nations if any other possible construction remains.' . . . [This canon] is
relevant to determining the substantive reach of a statute because 'the law
of nations,' or customary international law, includes limitations on a
nation's exercise of its jurisdiction to prescribe. Though it clearly has
constitutional authority to do so, Congress is generally presumed not to
have exceeded those customary international-law limits on jurisdiction to
prescribe. 2'
Turning to the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, Justice Scalia noted that a nation should refrain from
exercising its "legislative jurisdiction" to prescribe law "'with respect to a
person or activity having connections with another state when the exercise of
such jurisdiction is unreasonable.' ' 27" Because the activity occurred
primarily in the United Kingdom; the defendants were British corporations
and subjects having their principal place of business outside of the United
States; and Great Britain had a regulatory scheme that covered the conduct,
Justice Scalia felt that it would be "unimaginable that an assertion of
legislative jurisdiction by the United States would be considered reason-
able. "274
The same can be said of De Beers. That is, the title to the diamonds
passes in the United Kingdom; the defendants would be South African and
Swiss corporations and subjects having their principal place of business
outside of the United States; and both South Africa and European Economic
Community have a regulatory scheme that covers antitrust conduct.
270. Hartford Fire, 113 S. Ct. at 2910.
271. See notes 267-68, supra, regarding the existence of antitrust laws in South Africa and
the European Economic Community.
272. Hartford Fire, 113 S. Ct. at 2919 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Murray v. The
Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118 (1804) (Marshall, C.J.) and referencing RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 401-416 (1987)).
273. Id. at 2921 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 403(1) (1987)). By citing § 235 of the Restatement, which defines legislative
jurisdiction as "the authority of a state to make its law applicable to persons or activities,"
Justice Scalia also noted that such jurisdiction is "quite a separate matter from 'jurisdiction to
adjudicate'" as defined in § 231 of the Restatement. Id.
274. Id.
[Vol. 24
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If it were not for the 5-4 majority of the Hartford Fire Court that limited
the role of comity (including international law limitations),275 a suit against
De Beers would undoubtedly collapse on this one point. The currently
endorsed comity test appears to be simply whether there is a direct conflict
of laws. 6 With this test in place, comity considerations do not prevent a
United States court from exercising jurisdiction against De Beers in an
antitrust action primarily because De Beers is not a sovereign state and
because its conduct is not dictated by any foreign law or policy.2'
5. Naming the Proper Defendant-the Corporate Group Issue278
The obstacles involved in establishing subject matter and in personam
jurisdiction, addressing international comity considerations, and proving a
violation of the antitrust laws, represent only one aspect of the De Beers
problem. Another aspect of the problem exists in that "De Beers" is a
corporate group that (1) consists of two parent corporations and at least 36
wholly- or substantially-owned subsidiary corporations; (2) dominates numer-
ous associated companies; (3) controls an incalculable number of intermedi-
ary companies; (4) holds countless investment interests in still other compa-
nies;279 and (5) engages in the use of pseudonyms.' Who exactly is the
proper defendant? To appreciate the complexities stemming from the
organizational structures employed by De Beers, a general survey of the
theories of group responsibility that would bear on a comprehensive suit
against the group is in order.
For purposes of bringing an antitrust enforcement action, it would appear
that the best defendants are the two parents-they hold the reigns of the De
Beers empire. The facts would tend to support such an assertion. For
instance, the discussion of antitrust violations in Part III(D)(1), supra,
centered primarily on the conduct of the Central Selling Organization, which
is directly controlled by the two parents.28 With the complex structure of
275. Id. at 2895, 2910-11.
276. Id. at 2910-11 (The court refused to address the issue of whether a court should decline
to exercise Sherman Act jurisdiction on grounds of international comity. They concluded the
discussion by stating that "[w]e have no need in this case to address other considerations that
might inform a decision to refrain from the exercise of jurisdiction on grounds of international
comity") (emphasis added).
277. Comity considerations may, however, affect the relief a court could grant, e.g. comity
considerations will not allow relief to conflict with foreign law. Steele, 344 U.S. at 289.
Where no such conflict exists, however, "the District Court in exercising its equity powers may
command persons properly before it to cease or perform acts outside the territorial jurisdiction."
Id. at 289.
278. See generally BORN & WESTIN, supra note 39, at 104-18; PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE
LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCEDURAL LAW (1983).
279. See Part Il(A)(1), supra, for a discussion on the corporate structure of De Beers.
280. EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 202.
281. See Parts II(A)(1) and mI(D)(1), supra, for a discussion of the De Beers' parents role
in managing the CSO.
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the group however, such an assertion may not be effectively sustained. De
Beers regularly uses "straw man" tactics in the form of multiple layers of
intermediary companies involved in its various worldwide transactions in
order to protect the parents from jurisdiction and liability.2" Likewise,
any order against any one De Beers unit, whether a parent or not, would be
completely ineffective unless the order affected each possible subsidiary and
intermediary that De Beers could erect to circumvent the order.
The problem is complicated further by the distinction of jurisdiction and
liability. As one commentator expressed it, the conclusion "that a foreign
parent is subject to U.S. jurisdiction because of its U.S. subsidiary's
activities does not necessarily mean that the foreign company will be liable
on the merits because of its subsidiary's liability. Corporate veil-piercing
standards for jurisdiction and liability often differ significantly, and
jurisdiction can exist where liability does not."2" While the theories are
generally similar, the problem is nevertheless doubled by the requirement to
do a different "group analysis" for both procedural (jurisdiction) and
substantive law (liability) purposes.
At least three theories can be used to find the parent and subsidiary
responsible for the actions of each (and thus subject to jurisdiction and liable
for the actions of each): (1) the "alter ego" / "piercing the corporate veil"
/ "instrumentality" doctrine; (2) the agency relationship doctrine; and (3) the
enterprise law doctrine. 2
a. Theory One-Alter Ego
Procedural
The first theory is whether the subsidiary having contacts with the United
States is merely the "alter ego" of the parent. 2  In the landmark U.S.
Supreme Court case, Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co.,
Justice Brandeis set the traditional standard as being whether the parent and
subsidiary maintain separate and distinct corporate entities.28 In that case,
the Court found that "[t]he corporate separation, though perhaps formal, was
real. It was not pure fiction." 2" While the case continues to be fol-
lowed, 18 some courts follow a less rigorous standard:
282. See EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 202 (claiming that De Beers normally conducts all of
its American business outside of the United States, using upwards of 300 different corporate
pseudonyms and a series of "unrelated" distributors).
283. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 39, at 104-05.
284. See BORN & WESTIN, supra note 39, at 105, 112. See generally BLUMBERG, supra
note 278.
285. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 39, at 105.
286. 267 U.S. 333, 335 (1925) (Brandeis, J.).
287. Id.
288. See, e.g. Hargrave v. Fireboard Corp., 710 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1983).
[Vol. 24
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Lower courts have considered a variety of factors in determining whether
a subsidiary is the alter ego of its parent. Although generalization is
difficult, recurring issues include: (1) Are the same individuals officers
and directors of both corporations; (2) are separate tax returns, bank
accounts, corporate records, and minutes of corporate meetings maintained;
(3) how extensively and intensively does the parent control the subsidiary's
day-to-day operations; (4) how have the two corporations previously de-
scribed their relationship; and (5) how do the two corporations account and
pay for goods and services rendered to one another? A number of courts
have detailed lengthy lists of factors that bear on alter ego decisions.89
Substantive
Blumberg contends that "imposition of liability involves a more stringent
test than the assertion of jurisdiction." 2 °  Discussing what he calls the
"instrumentality" rule as restated in Lowendahl v. Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad,29' he points out that the party seeking to disregard the subsidiary
corporate entity must establish:
(1) That the parent controls and dominates the subsidiary to such
a degree that the subsidiary is a mere "instrumentality" of its
parent;
(2) That through its domination and control of the subsidiary, the
parent is perpetrating a fraud or working an injustice;
(3) That these elements result in an unjust loss or injury to the
complainant. 29
Blumberg goes on to list a checklist of 14 factors that the courts have looked
at when deciding whether these conditions have been met.29
Analysis
The primary problem with the alter ego doctrine in an analysis of the De
Beers group is the lack of information. Without knowing complex organiza-
tional arrangements within the group, it is impossible to analyze even the less
rigorous standard of the jurisdictional application let alone the substantive
requirements. Also, the alter ego doctrine assumes a parent-subsidiary
relationship; by definition it could not reach "unaffiliated" intermediaries that
are truly not owned by the De Beers group. Finally, there is a built-in
assumption that the subsidiary can be the alter ego of the parent, but not
289. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 39, at 110 (citing as examples Miles v. American Tel.
& Tel. Co., 703 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1983) and Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1940)).
290. BLUMBERG, supra note 278, § 3.07 at 75.
291. 247 A.D. 144, 287 N.Y.S. 62, aff'd 272 N.Y. 360, 6 N.E.2d 56 (1936).
292. BLUMBERG, supra note 278, § 1.02.1 at 14.
293. Id. at 16-17.
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vice-versa. Therefore, the acts of the subsidiaries could not be used to bind
the parents of De Beers.
b. Theory Two-Agency Relationship
Procedural
The second possible basis of multiple jurisdiction across the group exists
in the agency relationship doctrine. Under this doctrine, "a foreign corpora-
tion may be subjected to the general jurisdiction of the forum if the
corporation has systematically and continuously conducted business within the
forum through the agency of another party, including a subsidiary or an
entirely unaffiliated party." 2' The benefits of this approach are that (1) it
allows jurisdiction to attach to De Beers based on the acts of its "unaffiliat-
ed" wholesalers and retailers in the United States, 29s and (2) under tradi-
tional agency law, any corporation (parent or subsidiary) may act as an agent
for another corporation.2
At least two tests can be used under the agency doctrine. One test used
to determine whether an agency relationship exists such that jurisdictional can
be asserted measures the phrase "systematically and continuously conducted
business." One example of such a test is whether the purported agent does
all of the business which the defendant would otherwise have to do. For
instance, as stated by the Second Circuit in Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours,
such an agency relationship exists when the defendant's agent "provides
services beyond 'mere solicitation' and these services are sufficiently
important to the foreign corporation that if it did not have a representative
to perform them, the corporation's own officials would undertake to perform
substantially similar services."'
Another example of the "systematically and continuously conducted
business" test is whether the foreign defendant uses the agent to further its
business in the forum. The D.C. Circuit essentially applied this type of test
in Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distr. Py.298 The
court found that the business conducted by a New York importer / distributor
could be used as the basis for jurisdiction against a foreign defendant,
294. BORN & WESTIN, supra note 39, at 112.
295. See, e.g., Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 423 (9th
Cir. 1977) ("Although it has not always been designated as such in the cases, there is much
authority for such a "general agency" theory of "presence," and it is clear that whether the
alleged general agent was a subsidiary of the principal or independently owned is irrelevant.");
Great American Ins. Co. v. Katani Shipping Co., S.A., 429 F.2d 612, 614 (9th Cir. 1970)
(jurisdiction against foreign corporation with no resident officers, directors, employees, or
property in California sustained based on acts of its resident agent).
296. BLUMBERG, supra note 278, § 1.02.2 at 21.
297. 385 F.2d 116, 121 (2d Cir. 1967) (citing Frummer v. Hilton Hotels International, Inc.,
227 N.E.2d 851, 853 (N.Y. 1967)).
298. 647 F.2d 200 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc).
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because the defendant used the importer to develop and serve a market in the
United States. 299  The court noted that the arrangements to develop and
serve the market made the district court a "fair and reasonable" forum.3"
A second test used to determine whether an agency relationship exists for
jurisdictional purposes is based on traditional common law agency principals.
As expressed in Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co.:
While the mere existence of a parent-subsidiary relationship has been held
in itself to constitute insufficient evidence of control so as to subject the
parent to service for the acts of the subsidiary under the agency rationale,
if a common law agency is found to exist, the parent may properly be
served. 1
Distinguishing the type of test used in Gelfand (a "general agency" test), the
court noted that this is a separate and distinct test (a "special agency"
test)." The court explained that the general agency test used in Gelfand
requires that "substantial activities" be carried on for the benefit of the
principal, °3 i.e. not "mere solicitation."" Under the special agency
test, however, the plaintiff need only show the existence of an agency
relationship for the purpose of transacting business or committing the torts
complained of.3 5 If such a showing is made, the activities of the agent
would be imputed to the foreign principal, thereby providing jurisdiction "for
actions arising from those activities." 3"
Substantive
The test used to determine whether an agency relationship exists for
substantive law liability purposes is likewise based on traditional common
law principles. As stated by Blumberg, "[t]he traditional concept of agency
refers to a special legal relationship between separate legal persons as a result
of which the acts of one are attributable to the other with attendant legal
consequences."3 The explanation of the Wells Fargo court applies in the
context of liability as well as jurisdiction, i.e. on a showing of the existence
of an agency relationship for the purpose of transacting business or
299. Id. at 203.
300. Id.
301. Wells Fargo, 556 F.2d at 420.
302. Id. at 422.
303. Id. at 422-23.
304. Id. at 423 (citing Ge/fand, 385 F.2d at 121).
305. Id. at 422.
306. Id.
307. BLUMBERG, supra note 278, § 1.02.2 at 21.
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committing the torts complained of, the activities of the agent would be
imputed to the foreign principal for liability purposes.308
As a general proposition, agency relationships exist when the principal
manifests to the agent that the agent may act on his account, and the agent
consents to so act. 3°9 A contract between the principal and the agent is not
required; manifestations can be expressed in such forms as "written or
spoken words or other conduct of the principal which, reasonably interpret-
ed, causes the agent to believe that the principal desires him so to act on the
principal's account."3"' The manifestations of consent can also be created
by acquiescence and silence.3"'
Analysis
A recent De Beers advertisement in The Smithsonian illustrates one way
that the agency doctrine can be used to uphold jurisdiction against De
Beers.312  That advertisement, which contained the De Beers name,
extended an invitation to consumers to call a telephone number to receive
literature on diamonds and the name of the nearest diamond retailer. The
telephone number is connected to Lieber and Solow, a wholesaler of
diamonds located in New York.
Using the Gelfand general agency test, jurisdiction may be sustained
because the defendant's agent (Lieber and Solow) "provides services . . .
and these services are sufficiently important to the foreign corporation (De
Beers) that if it did not have a representative to perform them, the corpora-
tion's own officials would undertake to perform substantially similar
services. "3 The question is whether the services provided by Lieber and
Solow go "beyond 'mere solicitation'. ''314 In Gelfand, the defendant's use
of an agent to book reservations did go beyond mere solicitations.315
Using the logic of the Kaiser Stuhl approach, successful use of the
general agency test against De Beers becomes more probable. In Kaiser
Stuhl, Judge Ginsburg stated that "[t]he Australian defendants thus have
arranged for introduction of wine into the United States stream of commerce
with the expectation (or at least the intention and hope) that their products
will be shelved and sold at numerous local outlets in diverse parts of the
country," and later that the defendants "thus have chosen a course of conduct
that renders sales of their wine here not merely foreseeable, but affirmatively
308. Wells Fargo, 556 F.2d at 422.
309. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 15 (1984).
310. Id. § 26. See also id. § 15, cmt. a.
311. Id. § 43. See also id. § 26, cmt. d; § 15, cmt. a.
312. See supra note 251 regarding use of this fact to support minimum contacts with the
United States.
313. Gelfand, 385 F.2d at 121.
314. Id.
315. Id.
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welcomed. Unquestionably, they have a stake in, and expect to derive
benefits from, a market for their goods in the District." 36
The same can be said for De Beers. The purpose of the advertising and
referral service is to build customer interest, thereby allowing the introduc-
tion of De Beers diamonds into the United States stream of commerce with
the expectation that the diamonds will be sold. By deciding to make an
arrangement with a New York diamond wholesaler to facilitate this plan, De
Beers chose a "course of conduct that renders sales of their [diamonds] here
not merely foreseeable, but affirmatively welcomed. Unquestionably, they
have a stake in, and expect to derive benefits from, a market for their goods"
in the United States.
This logic may also be useful under the Wells Fargo special agency test,
i.e. an agency for the purpose of transacting business in the form of diamond
sales was created. The activities of the agent could therefore be imputed to
the principal De Beers, providing jurisdiction "for actions arising from those
activities"-the restraint of trade. The issue with the special agency test is
whether restraints of trade actually arise from the activities carried on by the
agent.
While there is a strong temptation to conclude that De Beers' subsidiaries
and unaffiliated intermediaries (such as Lieber and Solow) do the work that
De Beers would otherwise have to do (Gelfand), develop and serve the
diamond market in the United States on behalf of De Beers (Kaiser Stuhl),
and engage in the agency relationship for the purpose of transacting business
from which restraint of trade results (Wells Fargo), the caveat expressed by
Judge Learned Hand in Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp.
Co. cannot be forgotten: A subsidiary can become the agent of the parent
only "when both intend that relation to arise, for agency is consensual." 37
This final requirement based on traditional common law agency principals
becomes crucial. Did a truly consensual principal-agency relationship exist?
With the Lieber and Solow example, perhaps. Because of the high cost of
advertising and the fact that Lieber answers the phone number published by
De Beers, at a minimum a manifestation of consent to a principal-agent
relationship can be inferred by the conduct of the parties.3"' This conclu-
sion may not flow so easily from other business relationships, where the
connection to De Beers may be more difficult to establish.
316. Kaiser Stuhl, 647 F.2d at 203, 205 (Ginsburg, J.).
317. 31 F.2d 265, 267 (2d Cir. 1929) (L. Hand, J.). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
AGENCY § 15 (1984) ("An agency relation exists only if there has been a manifestation by the
principal to the agent that the agent may act on his account, and consent by the agent so to act.
(emphasis added)).
318. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY §§ 15, 26 (1984).
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c. Theory Three-Enterprise Law
A problem remains with the second theory: Who contracted with Lieber
and Solow for the advertising and referral service? If it was not a De Beers
parent, jurisdiction and liability could only be sustained against the subsidiary
that made the contract. 319  A third theory may provide a way to hold the
parent liable as well.
This theory, perhaps the best approach to obtaining both jurisdiction and
reciprocal liability over the entire group, is the Enterprise Law doctrine-a
development "in areas as diverse as torts, antitrust, jurisdiction, and
venue." 3" As expressed by Phillip Blumberg in The Law of Corporate
Groups, "[t]raditionally, the law has viewed each corporation as a separate
legal entity, with separate rights and obligations. For legal purposes, a
bright line of distinction was drawn between the corporation and its
shareholders." 3 21 He goes on to advocate "enterprise law" as an alterna-
tive to the previous two approaches, stating that this doctrine "looks at the
corporate group as a unit rather than at the various entities to which the
fragmented operations of the group have been allocated by the parent for the
convenience of the group as a whole." 32 His argument is forceful:
The solution to the procedural question should rest on the underlying
policies and purposes of the procedural statute or rule, on the one hand,
and the economic realities of the enterprise, on the other. That the
enterprise may have been divided into various corporate constituents for its
own convenience should have little significance if the policies of the
procedural statute or rule are better served by its application to the various
components of an integrated enterprise as a group.
23
In the substantive context of liability the U.S. Supreme Court adopted
enterprise law in the area of antitrust in the case Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., noting that:
[T]he coordinated activity of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary must
be viewed as that of a single enterprise for purposes of § 1 of the Sherman
Act. A parent and its wholly owned subsidiary have a complete unity of
interest. Their objectives are common, not disparate; their general
corporate actions are guided or determined not by two separate corporate
consciousness, but one. They are not unlike a multiple team of horses
drawing a vehicle under control of a single driver. With or without a
formal "agreement," the subsidiary acts for the benefit of the parent, its
sole shareholder .... a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary always have
319. Unless, of course, a second agency analysis provided a way to hold the parent liable
for the acts of the subsidiary-agent that did the contracting.
320. BLUMBERG, supra note 278, § 1.03 at 24.
321. Id. § 1.01.1 at 1 (1983).
322. Id. § 1.03 at 24.
323. Id. § 1.03 at 24-25. See also PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE
TO CORPORATION LAW: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW CORPORATE PERSONALITY (1993).
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a "unity of purpose or a common design." They share a common purpose
whether or not the parent keeps a tight reign over the subsidiary; the parent
may assert full control at any moment if the subsidiary fails to act in the
parent's best interests.324
Analysis
Now that the doctrine of enterprise law is established, it could prove
useful in reigning in the De Beers group. It should be noted, however, that
Copperweld held that the defendant and its wholly owned subsidiary "are
incapable of conspiring with each other for purposes of section 1 of the
Sherman Act"-thus excluding antitrust liability.3z  While this holding
eliminates the possibility of finding antitrust violations between the De Beers
parents and subsidiaries, it does not extend to violations by the De Beers
group in its interactions with non-affiliated parties. Also, the adoption of
enterprise law could conceivably work in the "other direction" as well, i.e.
to hold each wholly owned subsidiary responsible for an antitrust violation
by the parent. (Note, however, that the logic behind the theory as expressed
in Copperweld does not support holding the De Beers subsidiaries liable for
the acts of the parents).
It is interesting to note that the DOJ presented the enterprise law theory
in DEBEERS I almost fifty years ago. 326 They asserted that (1) De Beers
owned 80% of the shares of defendant Diamond Corporation; (2) defendant
Diamond Trading Company was wholly owned jointly by De Beers and
Diamond Corporation; (3) Sir Ernest Oppenheimer was the Chairman of the
Board of all three; and (4) the members of the Board of Directors was
identical across the three companies. 327 The court stated: "Apparently, it
is the Government's position that for the purpose of ascertaining if the defen-
dants are 'doing business' in this district it is to be inferred that the act of
any one of them, is the act of all, because of their close relationship."32
The court avoided the argument, asserting that it was not important in
deciding whether to grant the motion to dismiss the case.329 In the future,
however, perhaps such factual findings could support the use of modern
enterprise law theory against De Beers.
324. 467 U.S. 752, 771-72 (1984).
325. Id. at 777.
326. See 1948-1949 Trade Cas. (CCH), 62,248.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
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IV. SOLUTIONS AND IMPEDIMENTS TO THE
DIAMOND MONOPOLY PROBLEM
330
The most obvious solution to the De Beers problem is enforcement of the
existing antitrust laws. Enforcement is only one of the many possible
solutions to the De Beers problem, however. At least seven potential
solutions to the problem exist, ranging in difficulty and complexity:
1. Bring An Enforcement Action Against De Beers
2. Prosecute Resellers in the United States
3. Eliminate the Misleading Advertising
4. Strengthen Existing Antitrust Laws
5. Impose Import Duties on South African Diamonds
6. Assist in Establishing Another Diamonds Supplier
7. Ban De Beers Diamonds from the United States
This Comment will discuss each of these potential solutions, and will
examine possible impediments and alternatives to those solutions.
OPTION 1
Bring An Enforcement Action Against De Beers
The most straight-forward solution is to lodge an antitrust action against
De Beers and its myriad of subsidiaries and associated companies. As noted
in Part III(D)(1), supra, case law supports the proposition that De Beers has
violated those laws and can be held accountable for its conduct in a United
States court if either (1) the existence of the De Beers "rules" can be proven,
or (2) the existence of horizontal agreements to maintain prices can be prov-
en.
Impediment 1: The first problem with this approach is that the United
States is dealing with a large cash-rich organization-a syndicate that has
been labelled "omniscient and omnipotent." 331 It is difficult to control a
secret organization332 with a network of informants3 33 and its own police
force-the De Beers' International Diamond Security Organization.
33 4
330. See also HAWK, supra note 27 (discusses need to more stringently enforce antitrust
statutes internationally).
331. SCHUMACH, supra note 43, at 78. The De Beers / Anglo American group have a
combined market capitalization of $21 billion. Peter Fuhrman, Harry Oppenheimer, African
Empire Builder, Is Smiling Again, FORBES, Sept. 16, 1991, at 130. See also KANFER, supra
note 43, at 372 ("riches of the Oppenheimer empire" exceed $21 billion).
332. EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 93.
333. Id. at 60-65.
334. SCHUMACH, supra note 43, at 118.
[Vol. 24
54
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 24, No. 2 [1994], Art. 6
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol24/iss2/6
1994] U.S. ANTITRUST STATUTES AND INT'L DIAMOND TRADE 331
Likewise, it is hard to envision any effective remedy other than to impose a
tremendous fine. It would be onerous, however, to collect any such fine
because De Beers does not hold a considerable amount of assets in the United
States that could be attached.335
Impediment 2: Enforcement efforts by the DOJ may be sabotaged from
within the Executive branch. First, United States foreign trade policy may
indicate that the United States Government is unwilling to interfere with
imports of desirable commodities, as evidenced by the fact that the United
States was reluctant to impose sanctions against South Africa for its apartheid
practices because of the importance of diamonds.336 Second, it has been
suggested that De Beers is a major contributor to the American political
parties and would be able to exert considerable political pressure.337 Third,
some Executive branch agencies interfere with antitrust enforcement. For
instance, when the DOJ opened a grand jury investigation of a similar cartel
(dealing with Uranium), its efforts were hampered by the actions of the State
Department, who sought to have the investigation terminated.338 Similarly,
when Westinghouse brought a private antitrust action against the Uranium
cartel, the State Department influenced several governments to appear as
amici on the question of jurisdiction.339 Fourth, the South African govern-
ment may also be able to exert diplomatic pressure on the State Department
to aide De Beers-one of few South African companies in a position to
rebuild the weak South African economy.34
335. See EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 93.
336. E.g., President Chides News Media for Role in Regan Controversy, L.A. TIMES, July
19, 1986, at 1-13 (White House Chief of Staff Regan suggested the United States would do
nothing to sanction South Africa because of the importance of diamonds).
337. EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 207 ("On August 4, 1974, the Justice Department received
information that the 'De Beers organization is a large contributor to both political parties and
should this investigation get to a stage where cases are actually filed [the antitrust division]
would probably receive much political pressure.'").
338. See Wayne D. Collins, The Coming of Age of EC Competition Policy, 17 YALE J.
INT'L L. 249 (1992) (reviewing SIR LEON BRITrAN, COMPETITION POLICY AND MERGER
CONTROL IN THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET (1991)).
339. See id.; In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980) (the DOJ
prevailed in District Court through a default judgment. The court stated: "[Sihockingly to us,
the governments of the defaulters have subserviently presented for them their case against the
exercise of jurisdiction." Id. at 1256. The Seventh Circuit nevertheless affirmed the exercise
of jurisdiction and the default judgment. Id. at 1258). See also FUGATE, supra note 39, § 2.16,
at 111.
340. The De Beers / Anglo American, supra note 62, group employs some 250,000 people
in South Africa, and is considered "the most important private sector group in South Africa. "
Howard Preece, Anglo American Corporation, FORBES, May 25, 1992, at SA13. The group also
accounts for nearly 10% of the Gross National Product of South Africa. Peter Fuhrman, Harry
Oppenheimer, African Empire Builder, Is Smiling Again, FORBES, Sept. 16, 1991, at 130.
Oppenheimer (former chairman of De Beers), "is convinced that Anglo American [and De
Beers] can play the key role in lifting Africa out of the quicksand of poverty, charity and
bureaucratism." Id. The argument of De Beers chairman Julian Ogilvie Thompson is forceful:
"What the South African economy most critically needs is major encouragement of the private
sector, including those companies which are large enough and efficient enough to meet
55
Montpelier: Diamonds are Forever? Implications of United States Antitrust Sta
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1994
332 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
Impediment 3: Proof. Evidence is required both to assess De Beers
contacts with the United States, and to establish that it engages in anticompe-
titive conduct. While many arguments were made in this Comment that De
Beers does have national contacts with the United States, a particular court
may nevertheless require evidence of actual assets, offices, or agents.34'
Also, verification of the De Beers "rules" or agreements to horizontally
restrain trade would undoubtedly be a problem. To obtain evidence, the FBI
would have to seek affidavits and statements by diamond wholesalers and
retailers in the United States, perhaps based in part on the Diamond Dealers
Club consent decree discussed in Part III(D)(1)(a), supra. It would
nevertheless undoubtedly be faced with the problem of secrecy. 2
Alternative Strategy: The "admissions" doctrine in the Federal Rules of
Evidence may provide an easier solution to establishing a violation of the
antitrust laws, considering the exposition of De Beers conduct and policies
contained in its annual report.343 If the policies outlined in that statement
can be connected to the United States market, proof may not be a difficult
as it seems. Further proof that De Beers has "minimum contacts" with the
United States, imports diamonds into the United States, and has a substantial
impact in the United States market, apart from its own admissions, may also
be found in U.S. Customs import records. Formal entry is required for all
commercial goods with a value in excess of $12 50 .31' Believing it is
international competition head on." Howard Preece, Anglo American Corporation, FORBES,
May 25, 1992, at SA13. But see infra note 395 regarding the desire of the African National
Congress to break up the conglomerate.
341. In DEBEERS I, the DOJ is considering using a private-detective firm to aid in
collecting such evidence. See Richard B. Schmitt, U.S. Antitrust Effort May Use Private-
Detective Firm, WALL ST. J., May 6, 1994, at B5 ("Some lawyers speculate that [private
detective firm] Kroll may have information about assets that De Beers owns in the U.S., which
could provide a legal basis for a court's asserting jurisdiction over the company.")
342. EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 93.
343. See DE BEERS REPORT, supra note 54, at 1 and 12. Also, De Beers admits that it
"markets around 80 per cent of the world's diamond production," and that the retail sale of
diamonds was strongest in the United States. DE BEERS REPORT, supra note 54, at 4 and 12.
Admissions may be made offered against a party-opponent if the statement is "the party's own
statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity." Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A)
(1993). The statements made in the annual report were arguably made in a representative
capacity. If not, it can be argued that De Beers adopted a belief in the truth of the statements
by publishing them, thus falling under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(B). The statements can also be
used as admissions against all related De Beers firms, because the statement was made "by a
coconspirator of a party [the parent] during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy."
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). The firms within De Beers are coventurers in a conspiracy to
restrain trade. Pendency is satisfied because the conspiracy is still in existence. Finally, the
statements furthered the conspiracy by enticing investors to purchase the stock of the parents;
the capital generated by the stock sales was necessary to continue to conspiracy.
344. Importers make a formal entry by using U.S. Customs Form 3461, U.S. Customs
Form 7501 (entry summary), and a commercial invoice. 19 C.F.R. § 142.3 (1993), 19 U.S.C.
1484 (1993). See generally DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, IMPORTING INTO THE UNITED
STATES (1991).
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shielded by transferring title to the diamonds in London,345 there is nothing
to suggest that De Beers hides its name when doing so.' Also, most
import information is currently available electronically in the U.S. Customs
Automated Commercial System. 347  This system may be useful for U.S.
Customs to conduct an analysis of sources of diamond imports into the
United States. 3
OPTION 2
Prosecute Resellers in the United States
The second solution is to bring an antitrust action against those who
implement De Beers' anticompetitive strategies in the United States-the
resellers.
United States nationals and 'residents currently purchase De Beers
diamonds in London for sale in the United States, the fact of which could
possibly be established through the import records. 34 While not under a
formal distribution contract with De Beers,35° these resellers could never-
theless be viewed as engaging in anticompetitive behavior in violation of the
Sherman Act by either conforming to the De Beers "rules" or acting as De
Beers de facto agents As noted by the DOJ, "the form of agreement is not
345. Because De Beers distributed the diamonds in London and title transferred outside of
the United States, the judge ruled in DEBEERS I that De Beers was not "doing business" in the
United States and could not be held accountable under Sherman Act. 1948-1949 Trade Cas.
(CCH), 62,248; EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 93, 199-200. There is also a practical reason De
Beers does so: Customs regulations state that, "A nonresident corporation (i.e., one which is
not incorporated within the Customs territory of the United States or in the Virgin Islands of the
United States) shall not enter merchandise for consumption unless it: (a) Has a resident agent
in the State where the port of entry is located who is authorized to accept service of process
against such corporation." 19 C.F.R. § 141.18 (1993).
346. There may be another solution: The commercial invoice required under 19 C.F.R. §
142.3(a)(3) must describe the merchandise, the approximate value of the merchandise, and the
"name and complete address of the foreign individual or firm who is responsible for invoicing
the merchandise, ordinarily the manufacturer/seller, but where the manufacturer is not the seller,
the party who sold the merchandise for export to the U.S., or made the merchandise available
for sale." 19 C.F.R. § 142.6 (a)(1), (2), and (5) (1993). To eliminate the possibility of
distancing De Beers from the diamonds exported to the U.S., Congress could require a listing
of the chain of title to all precious gems.
347. "The Automated Commercial System (ACS) is the comprehensive tracking, controlling
and processing system of the U.S. Customs Service" and has been in existence since 1984. U.S.
CUSTOMS SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, OVERVIEW-AuTOMATED COMMERCIAL
SYSTEM 1. It also allows importers limited access to the system to electronically file entries
through the Automated Broker Interface (ABI). See id.; 19 C.F.R. § 143.0, et. seq. (1993).
348. 19 U.S.C. § 1411, approved December 20, 1993, directed the Secretary of the
Treasury to establish the National Customs Automation Program (NCAP), an upgrade to the
current ACS. 19 U.S.C. § 1411 (Supp. 1994). The NCAP is an "automated and electronic
system for processing commercial importations" which will provide the ability to select certain
entries and provide summaries. Id.
349. See supra note 344 regarding U.S. Customs entry requirements.
350. According to Koskoff, the lack of a distribution contract was a problem in DEBEERS
II. KOSKOFF, supra note 43, at 325.
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controlling; an informal undertaking embodied in a single conversation may
be just as punishable as the same undertaking contained in a complete
contract. "35
Impediment 1: If De Beers is a major contributor to American political
parties, there is also the possibility of political pressure from both Congress
and from within the executive branch.352 This apparently was not a
problem, however, in the Diamond Dealers Club case.
Impediment 2: The problem of proof also exists with the resellers.
While it may not be difficult to prove the connection between the resellers
and De Beers through the use of U.S. Customs import records, the FBI
would nevertheless most likely be confronted with secrecy.353 Perhaps
information could be obtained through the Diamond Dealers Club consent
decree discussed in Part III(D)(1)(a), supra. The FTC may also be able to
circumvent this barrier with its wide reaching statutory access to business
information under the Federal Trade Commission Act. 3
OPTION 3
Eliminate the Misleading Advertising
The advertising of diamonds in the United States is exceptionally
important in furthering the aims of the diamond cartel. Indeed, it is one of
the primary means by which De Beers controls the diamond industry.355
In section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, Congress
legislated that "[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce,
and unfair and deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are
declared illegal." 356  The legal standard which the FTC must meet to
establish that an advertisement is deceptive is not rigorous. It need only
351. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 5
(1977). See also Interstate Circuit, 306 U.S. at 226-27 ("it was enough that, knowing that
concerted action was contemplated and invited, the distributors gave their adherence to the
scheme and participated in it").
352. See note 337, supra, regarding the political clout of De Beers in the United States.
353. See EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 93.
354. 15 U.S.C. §§ 46(a) and 46(h) (Supp. 1993).
355. See e.g., DE BEERS REPORT, supra note 54, at 10-11. See also EPSTEIN, supra note
43, at 9-13; Patricia McLaughlin, Marketing is Forever, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, June 9, 1985,
at 35.
356. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (Supp. 1993).
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show a "capacity to deceive" in the advertisement. 357  The fact that an
expert would not be deceived by the advertisement is irrelevant.35
De Beers advertises heavily. 359  The advertisements certainly have a
capacity to deceive: De Beers suggests that diamonds are rare and highly
valuable (and therefore good investments), and that a person must spend
several months' salary to show affection properly. 3" In its annual report,
however, De Beers destroys this notion by claiming that price fluctuations
must be curtailed via price stabilization mechanisms in order to avoid
"destroy[ing] public confidence in the value of gem diamonds."36I The
reality not expressed in the advertising is that diamonds are plentiful (but
highly controlled to further the illusion that they are rare) and have little
actual value. 362  Furthermore, the idea that diamonds are the ultimate gift
of love that requires spending a certain amount is an unfounded notion
established solely by De Beers' advertising .363 The FTC should stop these
practices by issuing a cease and desist order364 or by imposing a fine.3 5
Alternative Strategy: At a minimum Congress could require disclosures
to consumers that the resale value diamonds is highly subjective and that the
consumer may realize only a fraction of the purchase price if the diamonds
are ever resold. Congress already has taken it upon itself to require
disclosures relating to other products, most notably cigarettes. 366 Taking
such action with respect to diamond advertising would at least begin the
process of breaking down the monumental myths surrounding diamonds that
have been created by De Beers. B67
357. Charles of the Ritz Distrb. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 1944) (upheld
FTC cease and desist order to stop using the word "rejuvenescence" on skin cream).
358. FTC v. Standard Education Soc., 302 U.S. 112, 116 (1937) (upheld FTC order on
advertising encyclopedia prices); FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 81 (1933) (upheld
finding that name of a type of wood was misleading).
359. See EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 9-13.
360. See Patricia McLaughlin, Marketing is Forever, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, June 9,
1985, at 35.
361. DE BEERS REPORT, supra note 54, at 10, 12.
362. Jewelry Industry Sees Big Turnaround in Sales, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1994, at D4
("De Beers has successfully perpetrated the illusion of the diamond as a rare and valuable stone.
In reality, diamonds are plentiful but tightly distributed."); Is It a Crack Or a Scratch? De
Beers, ECONOMIST, Sept. 12, 1992, at 76 ("[D]iamonds are plentiful and would be cheap but
for the global cartel operated by De Beers.") See also EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 237.
363. DE BEERS REPORT, supra note 54, at 10. See also Patricia McLaughlin, Marketing is
Forever, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, June 9, 1985, at 35.
364. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (Supp. 1993).
365. 15 U.S.C. § 45(l) (Supp. 1993).
366. See 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. 1993) (establishes a Federal program to deal with
cigarette labelling and advertising by requiring warnings on the hazards of cigarette smoke).
367. See KOSKOFF, supra note 43, at 273, 275; EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 9-13, 128, 133.
See also DE BEERS REPORT, supra note 54, at 10-11.
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Impediments: Again, there is the possibility of political pressure within
Congress and towards the FTC by both Congress and the executive
branch.3 68  Additionally, if the FTC decided to handle the problem with
trade rule regulations (in that the diamond market is an industry), problems
would undoubtedly arise during the mandatory notice and hearing pro-
cess.
369
OPTION 4
Strengthen Existing Antitrust Laws
Congress is not blind to the De Beers problem. As noted in the BNA
Antitrust & Trade Regulation Report:
Among a variety of proposals to be considered shortly on Capital Hill
involving possible trade sanctions against South Africa, subcommittees of
the House Foreign Affairs Committee are contemplating insertion of an
antitrust provision in the proposed legislation. . . . One element of the
package would state, as the sense of Congress, that the President should
direct the Justice Department to conduct an investigation, under federal
antitrust law, of the South African-controlled international diamond cartel.
House sources maintained that South Africa's De Beers controls 80% to
85% of the rough diamond market in gemstones and has acted to limit
diamond trade to maintain high prices."
There is a more direct way that Congress could alleviate the prob-
lem-by strengthening existing antitrust laws. The idea of modifying
antitrust laws is not new. Since the time the Sherman Act was first enacted,
various additional antitrust statutes have been enacted to delineate unaccept-
able antitrust behavior. 37' Some have been enacted to deal specifically with
the international aspects of antitrust, such as the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1982 (FTAIA). 3  Unfortunately, this particular
statute is limited by its own terms in that it does not apply to foreign imports
into the United States, but rather exports from the United States. 373
368. See note 337, supra, regarding the political clout of De Beers in the United States.
369. 15 U.S.C. § 57b-3 (Supp. 1993).
370. House Panels Would Urge Probe of Diamond Cartel, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep.
(BNA), No. 1359 (Mar. 31, 1988).
371. E.g., the Clayton Act of 1914 (prohibited acquisitions of companies that would lessen
trade), the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 (directed FTC to oversee competitive
behavior), the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936 (outlawed price discrimination), the Celler-
Kefauver Act of 1950 (prohibited acquisitions of company assets that would lessen trade), and
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act of 1976 (DOJ and FTC must be informed of prospective mergers that
could affect antitrust).
372. E.g., Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (FTAIA), 15 U.S.C. § 6
(1982).
373. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (FTAIA), 15 U.S.C. § 6 (1982).
See also HAWK, supra note 27.
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Statutes such as the FTAIA further illustrate that Congress is aware that
antitrust problems exist with international trade. Congress should consider
similar legislation that would clarify existing case law such as Hartford Fire
to avoid any possible negative interpretations of the extraterritorial reach of
the antitrust statutes as applied to foreign concerns. For example, it could
state that the Sherman Act specifically applies to those foreign concerns who
knowingly import goods into the United States, even if the entity violating
the Act uses complex resale arrangements in order to be several levels
removed from the actual importers so as to avoid subject matter jurisdiction.
This would also solve the international law comity issue raised by Justice
Scalia in his dissent HartfordFire; he indicated that an assertion of legislative
jurisdiction by the United States would be considered reasonable by the
courts if Congress made a statutory indication of the assertion.374 Similar-
ly, Congress could state a clear policy on corporate parent responsibility in
the antitrust arena, i.e. that the use of "straw man" tactics and complex
corporate structures are no defense to a Sherman Act claim if the seller
knowingly sells the goods with the intent that the goods be resold in the
United States.
OPTION 5
Impose Import Duties on South African Diamonds
One would think that the imposition of high import duties on South
African diamonds would make the transaction costs too high for De Beers to
continue doing business in the United States market. De Beers would be
forced to either pull out of the market altogether or increase the price of its
diamonds beyond that which consumers would be willing to pay.
Impediment: The United States once tried to impose duties on imported
diamonds. The costs of the enforcement effort exceeded the benefit of the
revenue-raising scheme, and in reality was ineffective:
Once upon a time diamond smuggling into the United States was undertak-
en principally to save duties and excise taxes totaling 20 percent on
polished and 10 percent on rough. In those days the professional diamond
smugglers constituted a great industry, a well-ordered system of transporta-
tion operating something like United Parcel, and with the same reliability
and regularity-and integrity. Only an infinitesimal percentage of the
smuggled goods were detected, and the smuggling rings would make good
any losses. Customs couldn't compete. 375
374. Harord Fire, 113 S. Ct. at 2918-19 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[tihe question of this
case is whether, and to what extent, Congress has exercised that undoubted legislative
jurisdiction in enacting the Sherman Act. Through it clearly has constitutional authority to
do so, Congress is generally presumed not to have exceeded those customary international-law
limits on jurisdiction to prescribe").
375. KOSKOFF, supra note 43, at 265.
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The United States could do little more than abolish duties on diamonds in
January of 1981.376
While the United States could impose such a duty on only South African
diamonds, it would be extremely difficult to segregate South African
diamonds from other diamonds. It could possibly be accomplished under
agreements with certain suppliers, such as Russia and Canada, if those
suppliers were not affiliated with the CSO, and if mechanisms were
established to prevent their diamonds from being commingled with CSO
diamonds.
OPTION 6
Assist in Establishing Another Diamonds Supplier
Another way to protect the American public is to assist in the establish-
ment of another major diamond producer, thereby increasing competition.
While De Beers controls the exports of most of the world's diamond
producing countries,37 the United States may find a solution in Russia.
The threat from Russia, one of the world's largest diamond countries,
disturbs De Beers. 3
On July 25, 1990, the now defunct central government of the Soviet
Union signed a controversial contract granting De Beers exclusive distributor
rights for the entire diamond supply of Russia. 379  Being in need of hard
currency, 310 the Soviet Union entered a five-year, $5 billion contract with
De Beers. 38' The state of Russia, however, which had declared its inde-
pendence on June 12, apparently would like to repudiate the contract and
declare it void so as to market the diamonds itself.31
376. Id. at 265-66. There is currently no duty on diamonds. See UNITED STATES INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES 71-73
(1994). (The Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States is not published in the U.S.
Code, but is maintained by the International Trade Commission. See 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (Supp.
1993)).
377. KOSKOFF, supra note 43, at 71.
378. KOSKOFF, supra note 43, at 71. See also Steven Mufson, The Rocks And a Hard
Place-De Beers Worried Over Russian Gems, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1992, at Fl.
379. See Soviet Loan Stands-De Beers, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1990, at P3; Russia
Challenges Soviet Government on Diamond Exports, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 12, 1990, at 69.
380. EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 18.
381. Russia Challenges Soviet Government on Diamond Exports, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 12,
1990, at 69; Leslie Shepherd, Russian Republic Says Soviet Contracts Invalid, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, Aug. 12, 1990, at A4.
382. See Soviet Loan Stands-De Beers, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1990, at P3. Russia
Challenges Soviet Government on Diamond Exports, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 12, 1990, at 69. See
also Is It a Crack Or a Scratch? De Beers, ECONOMIST, Sept. 12, 1992, at 76 ("Rumours of
a huge stockpile of diamonds in Russia persist... Starved of cash, Russia may succumb to the
temptation to sell some of its hoard.") At a minimum, the Russian government would like to
increase the contract price. Vladimir Kvint, Sorry, Mr. Oppenheimer, FORBES, Feb. 15, 1993,
at 42 ("If the Russians are playing rough with De Beers, it's because they badly need foreign
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The United States should consider encouraging Russia to repudiate the
contract made by the Soviets as (1) contrary to a capitalist system which the
Russian government has been implementing,383 and (2) void as an illegal
contract that Russia is under no obligation to honor. 31 The United States
could also offer Russia special incentives to break the contract, such as
providing them with special opportunities to market their diamonds directly
in the United States. Besides being in our best interests to bolster the
languishing Russian capitalist system and strengthen diplomatic relations,3
such an alliance would also solve the effects of the De Beers problem as it
impacts the American consumer.
The United States may also find a solution in Canada. It has been
reported that Canada is in the process of building the first diamond mine in
Canada's arctic, and that it may be one of the world's richest diamond
deposits-large enough to challenge De Beers for control of the world
diamond market. 31 There is concern, however, that the mining companies
will sell the diamonds through the De Beers' CSO, which already controls
most of the world's producers.3 7 Solutions involving the Canadian mines
could include (1) enticing Canada to prevent any contracting between the
Canadian mines and CSO (perhaps via future NAFTA amendments), and (2)
exchange ... Squeezing more money out of De Beers is one way to get it.") But see Russia
Vows Aid on Gems, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1994, at C19 (reporting that Russia "remained
committed" to the five-year contract).
383. See Michael Parks, Yeltsin's Cabinet OKs Its Boldest Reform Plan, L.A. TIMES, June
26, 1992, at Al ("The 3-year program is intended to put Russia firmly on a road to
capitalism"); Richard Boudreaux, 2 Years After Coup, Russia is Committed to Capitalism, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 15, 1993, at A5. Implementing a capitalist economy, Russia would economically
harm itself by honoring the anticompetitive contract. The same arguments used to enact the
Sherman Act, supra notes 8 and 10, apply equally to Russia.
384. Russia had already declared its independence when the Soviet Union made the contract.
The Soviet Union was therefore without the sovereign power necessary to make the contract with
respect to the state of Russia. Russia is therefore not bound to honor the contract. A second
argument that the successor state of Russia is not liable for the contracts of the predecessor state
of the Soviet Union may also be viable. See MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 184 ("States, not their governments, are subjects of international law. So
long as the state remains the same, a succession of governments does not affect the state's
international legal rights and duties.") and 185-86 ("Generally, except for territorial agreements,
successor states, as distinguished from successor governments, are not bound by the international
agreements of their predecessors."). The Russian government took over a successor
state-Russia-not the old government of the former Soviet Union. There is also the possibility
of aiding Russia without violating the contract: "[J]oint ventures are already being set up in
Moscow to polish diamonds, which the Russians could sell in the West without violating any
agreement with De Beers, whose contracts cover only rough diamonds." Is It a Crack Or a
Scratch? De Beers, ECONOMIST, Sept. 12, 1992, at 76. See also Vladimir Kvint, Sorry, Mr.
Oppenheimer, FORBES, Feb. 15, 1993, at 42.
385. See Sergei Khrushchev, Capitalism and Chaos: Russia's Next Implosion, WASH. POST,
Aug. 16, 1992, at C3; Mona Charen, Give Capitalism Time To Thrive in Russia, ST. LOUIS
POST DISPATCH, Apr. 13, 1993, at 3B.
386. Canadian Diamond Mines May Lead to a Challenge of the De Beers System, CHIC.
TRIB., Feb. 14, 1994, at 8.
387. Id.
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assisting in a "joining of forces" between the Canadian and Russian mining
operations.
Impediments: While there is a strong desire to provide aid to Rus-
sia, 31 political pressure could prevent this from occurring. 319  Also,
introducing low-price competition too abruptly could cause the collapse of the
diamond market and bring about the worthlessness of -consumer diamond
investments. 39  Finally, the countries may find that it is to their economic
advantage to mimic De Beers, thereby enjoying the artificially high profits
diamonds generate.
Related Solution: Gem-quality diamonds can be synthetically manufac-
tured.39 1 People would be virtually unable to distinguish a synthetic
diamond from a mined diamond. 3 2  The machinery and presses for the
process, however, are extremely expensive to set up.393 The United States
could consider subsidizing the machinery and processes necessary to
synthesize diamonds. The subsidy could be as minor as favorable income tax
incentives.
OPTION 7
Ban De Beers Diamonds from the United States
The United States could simply ban the import of De Beers diamonds
altogether either through legislative action or through the broad enforcement
ability of the International Trade Commission.394
388. See President is Eager to Send Russia Aid, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Sept. 23, 1993,
at 6A (encouraging Congress to approve $2.5 billion); Michael Ross, 1.6 Billion for Russia
Backed in Congress, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1993, at Al.; Ann Devroy, Clinton Said to be
Considering Boost in Level of Aid to Russia, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 1993, at A17 (from $700
million).
389. See supra note 337 regarding the political clout of De Beers in the United States.
390. EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 252-53. See also Patricia McLaughlin, Marketing is
Forever, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, June 9, 1985, at 35.
391. EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 168-70. See KANFER, supra note 43, at 272-73 regarding
the synthetic manufacture of diamond grit.
392. EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 168-70.
393. Id. It is interesting to note that General Electric discovered how to synthetically
manufacture gem quality diamonds. Id. The recent indictment in DEBEERS In alleges that
they conspired with De Beers to manipulate prices of synthetic industrial grade diamonds. See
William M. Carley, Price-Fixing Charges Put GE and DeBeers Under Tough Scrutiny, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 22, 1994, at AI; John Mintz, GE, De Beers Indicted On Price-Fixing Charges
Firms Accused of Bid to Hike Diamond Prices, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1994, at D1. The
allegation illustrates the problem that it is easier to join the cartel rather than undercut the market
and produce less profit.
394. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (1980) ("If the Commission determines, as a result of an
investigation under this section, that there is violation of this section, it shall direct that the
articles concerned, imported by any person violating the provision of this section, be excluded
from entry into the United States.")
64
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 24, No. 2 [1994], Art. 6
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol24/iss2/6
1994] U.S. ANTITRUST STATUTES AND INT'L DIAMOND TRADE 341
Impediments: The problem that existed when duties were imposed on
diamonds would most reoccur if the De Beers commodity was completely
banned-smuggling. Alternatively, De Beers could establish an intricate
network of pseudonym selling organizations overnight in order to avoid the
ban. There is also the problem of establishing an adequate alternative
supplier not affiliated with De Beers so that the demand for diamonds in the
United States could be adequately met. Given the power of De Beers in the
industry, this is highly unlikely unless the United States took affirmative
steps to establish such a supplier as suggested in the previous solution. As
for a ban on all imported diamonds, the government may likely find that the
American public is not ready to stop buying diamonds, no matter what the
cost.
CONCLUSION
In all fairness, apart from the United States antitrust violations, there is
much to admire about De Beers. While nations have risen and fallen, De
Beers has flourished for over 100 years, enduring through a global
depression, two world wars, the decolonization of South Africa, and the
imposition of economic sanctions against that country; it is now weathering
the trials inherent in eliminating apartheid in South Africa.3  It completely
controls a prosperous worldwide industry through arrangements that lock up
most of the world's supply of diamonds from mining through retailing.396
It ensures consistent demand for its product through decades of extraordinary
advertising and marketing genius.3" It has been able to consistently
increase the price of its product over the years without suffering a serious
395. De Beers is now facing a new crisis at home that could threaten its access to South
African diamond mines (or even its own existence): "The African National Congress is opposed
to the big firms' concentrated economic power." The Unbundling Begins: South African
Conglomerates, ECONOMIST, May 15, 1993, at 84. There is speculation that the ANC will seek
the breakup of conglomerates such as De Beers, and eliminate cross-directorships (through which
competing companies share directors). Id. Foreseeing the inevitable, De Beers (and other South
African conglomerates) "have systematically dispersed their operations and capital throughout
the world." See Antero Pietila, The Challenge Ahead in S. Africa: Money, NEWSDAY, May 4,
1994, at A37. See also KANFER, supra note 43, at 372. But see Peter Fuhrman, Harry
Oppenheimer, African Empire Builder, Is Smiling Again, FORBES, Sept. 16, 1991, at 130("Oppenheimer thinks the answer lies in ... encouraging the black community to build its stake
in the capitalist system .... Winning over the opposition by giving them a piece of the action
is a technique Oppenheimer has succeeded with before .... Oppenheimer thinks the backs can
be co-opted to capitalism and to a harmonious multiracial society.") To achieve this end, it has
been reported that Anglo, supra note 62, is attempting to improve conditions in South Africa by
increasing efforts to educate and train blacks, narrowing pay differentials between black and
white, promoting blacks to skilled jobs, giving blacks the same housing subsidies whites receive,
and offering free shares of the company. The Oppenheimer Empire: South Africa's Family
Affair, EONOMIST, July 1, 1989, at 59.
396. See KOSKOFF, supra note 43, at 126-27; EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 59-65.
397. See KOSKOFF, supra note 43, at 273-75; EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 9-13, 128-33. See
also DE BEERS REPORT, supra note 54, at 10.
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setback despite the fact that its resale value is low.39 As for the antitrust
violations, the fact that De Beers has successfully employed complex
organizational arrangements to avoid United States antitrust laws for as long
as it has is a testimonial to the exceptional organizational management and
legal talent employed by the De Beers group.3"
There is still the problem of the antitrust violations, however. If De
Beers wishes to sell its diamonds in the United States forum, it should be
bound by the laws and obligations that everyone else engaging in that forum
must respect. Whether the antitrust laws are right or wrong, they do exist
and De Beers-no matter how powerful or admirable-should not be allowed
to avoid them where others cannot.
Should the United States "trust" De Beers to be fair in its application of
its monopolistic business practices? Consider the statement of Mr. H.F.
Oppenheimer, the former Chairman of De Beers:
Whether this measure of control amounts to a monopoly I would not know,
but if it does, it is certainly a monopoly of a most unusual kind. There is
no one concerned with diamonds, whether as producer, dealer, cutter,jeweller or customer, who does not benefit from it. It protects not only the
shareholders of diamond companies, but also the miners they employ and
the communities that are dependant on their operations ... We are very
conscious of our responsibilities not only to our shareholders, not only to
the industry as a whole and to the consuming public, but also to the
governments of the countries in which we operate.'
It is difficult to see how the American people benefit from monopoliza-
tion and price-fixing. 40 The consumer cannot benefit when De Beers
establishes exorbitant prices for a commodity that has little actual value. The
consumer cannot benefit when De Beers admittedly maintains those artificial
prices through price stabilization schemes.' It is difficult to see how De
Beers is conscious of its responsibility to the consuming public when it takes
a insignificant product once unknown to the general populace, and then
convinces those people through massive advertising campaigns that the
product is the ultimate way of expressing love. 43 It is also difficult to see
how De Beers is conscious of its responsibility to the governments of the
398. See KOSKOFF, supra note 43, at 130; SCHUMACH, supra note 43, at 191-211 (1981);
EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 12.
399. See EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 202.
400. DE BEERS REPORT, supra note 54, at 12 (statement of H.F. Oppenheimer).
401. The DOJ apparently agrees. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 36 (1988) ("[T]hese Guidelines make plain the
Department's commitment to prosecute naked restraints of trade, such as horizontal price fixing,
bid rigging, and market allocation, which by their nature have no plausible connection to
achieving significant integrative efficiencies that benefit U.S. consumers and that almost certainly
reduce output and/or raise prices to the detriment of U.S. consumers" (emphasis added)).
402. DE BEERS REPORT, supra note 54, at 12.
403. Id. at 10.
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countries in which it operates when it violates the laws of its largest market,
the United States.'
Given the recent indictment, the De Beers response would undoubtedly
be "We don't do business in the U.S. "-somehow inferring that the
American public are not its consumers.' The American people deserve
better than open monopolization amongst such preposterous obfuscation. It
is manifestly unjust to allow a large portion of the American public to be
taken advantage of by foreign organizations while, at the same time, touting
the importance of enforcing the antitrust laws.' Instead of trusting De
Beers to ensure that the public benefits from monopolization, it is time for
the United States Government to ensure that the public benefits from NO
monopolization, whether "unusual" or otherwise. It is also time to show
American businesses that they are not the only ones who have to abide by the
spirit and letter of the antitrust laws.
The courts appear ready to do their part to correct the injustices by
applying American antitrust laws evenly to those international businesses that
wish to partake of the benefits of the American market. With DEBEERS III,
the Justice Department also appears ready to send the signal that it will
enforce its antitrust laws no matter how large and powerful the foreign
concern is.' Taking action against De Beers beyond the limited focus of
an industrial diamond indictment is the next logical step.
Difficult issues remain for which there are no simple solutions. Those
issues must, however, be solved. As the global economy widens, the United
States will become more dependent on international trade for its economic
growth and survival. It remains to be seen, however, whether the Legislative
and Executive branches are willing to risk jeopardizing that trade by
imposing the same strict antitrust standards on foreign producers as they do
on domestic businesses. One thing is for certain-how the United States
handles its affairs with foreign nations will become more crucial as the level
404. See EPSTEIN, supra note 43, at 57; SCHUMACH, supra note 43, at 104.
405. William M. Carley, Price-Fixing Charges Put GE and DeBeers Under Tough Scrutiny,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 1994 at Al.
406. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 1 (1988) ("The U.S. antitrust laws are the legal embodiment of
our nation's commitment to a free market economy. The competitive process, unimpeded by
privately and governmentally imposed barriers, ensures the most efficient allocation of resources
and the maximization of consumer welfare." This language suggests that the antitrust laws
underpin our capitalist society).
407. Commenting on the recent indictment of De Beers, Anne Bingaman, current Assistant
Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, stated that "[tihe Antitrust Division will
not tolerate anticompetitive acts by two firms who dominate their worldwide markets, or
sophisticated schemes that are used to fix prices and to disguise criminal activity. The Division
will actively pursue such international cartels." 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH), 45,094. See
Cindy Skrzycki, The Regulators: Reversing Reagan Policy-At Justice, Anne Bingaman Beefs
Up the Trustbusters, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 1994, at CO. See also DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 78-79 (1988). The
DOJ published hypothetical case discussions to illustrate how and when it would apply antitrust
law. Case 14, International Cartel Activities, is revealing in that unusually parallels many De
Beers activities.
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of its involvement in international trade increases. Can the United States
allow the American people to be harmed as a by-product of that trade?
Dale J. Montpelier
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